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EXPLAINING THE SIOUX MILITARY
COMMISSION OF 1862

Maeve Herbert*

INTRODUCTION

From the doorway of her family's house, it looked to fourteenyear old Cecelia Campbell as though a boa constrictor was moving
across the Minnesota plains.' The approaching form was in fact a
steady column of organized forces, drawn primarily from the
Mdewakanton Sioux tribe,2 and poised to launch the first of a series
of attacks on Minnesota's frontier settlements.3 Over the next four
days, from August 18 to 22, 1862, as reports of what some claimed to
be the largest killing of civilians in the country's history sounded
across the frontier press and Cecelia trudged to the enemy's camp

* Maeve Herbert is a 2009 J.D. candidate at Columbia Law School and Articles
Editor of the Columbia Human Rights Law Review. Many thanks to Professor
John F. Witt, Sagar Ravi, Maureen Herbert, Brad Herbert, and Noah N. Glass for
their helpful comments on earlier drafts and to the Columbia Human Rights Law
Review for editorial assistance.
1.
Cecilia Campbell Stay's Account, in Through Dakota Eyes: Narrative
Accounts of the Minnesota Indian War of 1862, at 44, 45 (Gary C. Anderson &
Alan R. Woolworth eds., 1988) [hereinafter Dakota Eyes] ("I went and stood at
the door and saw something dark moving along the ground as far as I could see[:]
it was shaped like a boa constrictor.").
2.
The Mdewakanton tribe is part of what is often identified as the Sioux
confederacy or Sioux Nation, a group comprised of seven major tribal divisions.
See Gary Clayton Anderson, Little Crow: Spokesman for the Sioux 6 (1986).
Where possible, this Note will refer to the specific tribal division. Otherwise, this
Note will use the term "Sioux" for conformity with historical records, recognizing,
however, that "Dakota" is the more accurate term and preferred among many
Mdewakantons today. Id. For details on the reported scope of Mdewakanton
involvement in the initial attacks, see infra notes 39 and 92.
3.
See Roy W. Meyer, History of the Santee Sioux: United States Indian
Policy on Trial 119-20 (1967).
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along with other captives,4 editorialists and government officials
immediately began calling for the total extermination of the Sioux.'
And yet, five weeks after Colonel Henry H. Sibley set out on the
planned campaign of extermination, he instead announced that he
and his men would be holding a military commission.6
In the subsequent proceedings, five officers gathered each
morning over the course of six weeks, first in a tent and later in a
fur-trader's kitchen,7 to determine whether those seated opposite
them had voluntarily participated in the attacks. Over the past
century, these proceedings have incited an enormous amount of
criticism.8 More recently, in the wake of the establishment of military
4.
See, e.g., Letter from John H. Pope, Major Gen., Gen. Staff, U.S.
Volunteers & Brigadier Gen., Commanding Dep't of the Nw., Gen. Staff, U.S.
Army, to Henry W. Halleck, Major Gen., Gen.-in-Chief, Gen. Staff, U.S. Army
(Sept. 23, 1862), in 13 War of The Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records
of the Union and Confederate Armies, Ser. 1, at 663, 663 (1885) [hereinafter 13
OR] (estimating five hundred deaths); Letter from Thomas J. Galbraith, U.S.
Agent for the Sioux Indians, to Alexander Ramsey, Governor of Minn. (Aug. 20,
1862), in St. Paul Daily Press, Aug. 22, 1862, at 1 (reporting one hundred known
deaths and one thousand believed deaths); The Sioux War, St. Paul Daily Press,
Aug. 22, 1862, at 1 (describing the massacre as "more horrible than has been
perpetrated by the savage devils within the present century"); The Sioux War:
Lieutenant Governor Donnelly's Report, Mankato Wkly. Rec., Sept. 6, 1862, at 1
(reporting that it would be "miraculous if one-half the population has escaped").
For Campbell's description of her "captivity," see Cecilia Campbell Stay's
Account, supra note 1, at 135-38. Official military titles included in letter
citations are compiled from information available in the source itself, the
American Civil War Research Database, and military records from the Ancestry
Library Database.
5.
See infra notes 44-47 and accompanying text; see also Letter from
Thomas J. Galbraith to Alexander Ramsey, supra note 4 (calling for an
"exterminating campaign"); The Sioux War, Mankato Semi-Wkly. Rec., Aug. 23,
1862, at 1 (reporting that "[t]he facts are horrifying in the extreme, and call for
the most summary measures of retaliation by the Government"); The Sioux War,
St. Paul Daily Press, supra note 4 ("We hope they will be able to overtake their
murderous and cowardly foe and exterminate them.").
6.
Letter from Henry H. Sibley, Colonel, Commanding Military Expedition,
Minn. State Militia, to John H. Pope, Major Gen., Gen. Staff, U.S. Volunteers &
Brigadier Gen., Commanding Dep't of the Nw., Gen. Staff, U.S. Army (Sept. 27,
1862), in 13 OR, supra note 4, at 679, 679.
7.
See The Indian Expedition, St. Paul Pioneer, Nov. 15, 1862, at 1.
8.
See, e.g., Louis Fischer, Military Tribunals and Presidential Power:
American Revolution to the War on Terrorism 54 (2007) (noting that the military
commission has been the subject of several critiques); William Watts Folwell, The
Court Proceedings in the Trial of Dakota Indians Following the Massacre in
Minnesota in August 1862, at 3 (1927) (referring to the trials as a "disgraceful
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commissions at Guant6.namo, scholars have cited the slim procedural
safeguards afforded to the Sioux as evidence of the need for
institutional reforms. 9
Curiously, though, much of the recent scholarship on military
commissions has glossed over a fundamental question: Why did the
United States convene a military commission? For two centuries,
European immigrants to the New World had responded to Indian
attacks with virtually unrestrained retaliatory violence.' ° The real
question raised by the commission is not whether it afforded due
process but why the United States provided any process at all.
This Note seeks to address this inquiry, by exploring the
circumstances surrounding the commission and the explicit
justifications put forth by those in command. While it is certainly
true, as Justice Stevens recently summarized," that military
commissions emerged out of military necessity, the necessity that

story of passion, partiality, and cruelty ...a travesty of justice"); Marouf Hasian,
In the Name of Necessity: Military Tribunals and the Loss of American Civil
Liberties 66-67 (2005) (criticizing the commission's failure to treat the
defendants as prisoners of war); Ryan H. Beery, Modern Use of Military
Tribunals: A Legal "Can" and a Political "Should"?, 28 Ohio. N.U. L. Rev. 789,
789 (2002) (critiquing the commission's "lax rules of evidence and a general ad
hoc legal procedure that created an atmosphere of injustice"); Michal R. Belknap,
A Putrid Pedigree: The Bush Administration's Military Tribunals in Historical
Perspective, 38 Cal. W. L. Rev. 433, 452-54 (2002) (citing the commission as an
example of the "abuses and injustice" that "pock-mark the domestic record of
these tribunals"); Carol Chomsky, The United States-Dakota War Trials:A Study
in Military Injustice, 43 Stan. L. Rev. 13, 14-15 (1990) (summarizing the
numerous procedural flaws of the commission); Joshua S. Clover, "Remember,
We're The Good Guys": The Classification and Trial of the Guantdnamo Bay
Detainees, 45 S. Tex. L. Rev. 351, 375-76 (2004) (citing the commission as "an
example of what can go wrong with military commissions when left unchecked");
Natsu Taylor Saito, Will Force Trump Legality After September 11? American
JurisprudenceConfronts the Rule of Law, 17 Geo. Immig. L.J. 1, 47, 50 (2002)
(referencing the commission as an example of force trumping legality); Jessica
Tully, Military Commissions are Governed by Military and International Law:
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 45 Duq. L. Rev. 805, 810 (2007) (referencing the
commission as an example of "highly irregular trial procedures, overzealous
prosecutors, and exaggerated sentencing guidelines"); Stephen R. Riggs, Letter to
the Editor, History of the Sioux War, St. Paul Daily Press, Dec. 17, 1863, at 2
(finding that the military commission's hasty procedures were "not in accordance
with Military Regulations and the spirit of Christianity").
9.
See discussion supra note 8.
10.
See infra text accompanying notes 49-57.
11.
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 590-91 (2006).
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animated a decision to convene a commission was not always, as
scholars have implied, the need to adjudicate individual culpability
in the absence of an available court of law. 2 Instead, archival records
from one of the best documented and earliest examples of a military
commission established in response to attacks on civilians reveal a
more complex set of goals.
Specifically, the commanders who convened, participated in,
and approved the Sioux military commission did so not in an attempt
to satisfy the Army's truth-seeking needs or to provide defendants
with due process, but rather, as a less costly, more efficient
alternative to retaliatory warfare. These records reveal that officers
convened the commission to deal with the grueling reality of limited
military resources, a mobile and elusive enemy, and a newspaper
industry that rendered public opinion an important factor in military
strategy. Set in the context of this beleaguered war effort, officials
did not intend for the commission to serve as a replacement for a
court of law, but rather, as a proxy for the battlefield.
Part I of this Note describes current scholarship on the
history of military commissions and identifies a gap in the prevailing
narrative, namely, an explanation for why the military favored a
legal process over collective reprisals or summary executions. Part II
seeks to address this gap, by examining the circumstances in which
the military convened the commission and the context in which
President Abraham Lincoln approved it. Part III concludes that this
historical perspective helps clarify the original role of military
commissions as articulated in the Supreme Court case of Hamdan v.
Rumsfeld and calls into question whether an institution that
emerged as a substitute for force is the right vehicle for providing
due process.
I.

A GAP IN THE SCHOLARSHIP ON THE HISTORY OF MILITARY
COMMISSIONS

Over the past seven years, the United States' decision to
establish military commissions in the wake of the attacks of
September 11, 2001, has given rise to a rich body of scholarly
literature. 13 Given that the Sioux military commission marked one of
12.

See infra text accompanying note 22.

13.

Detlev F. Vagts, Military Commissions: A Concise History, 101 Am. J.

Int'l L. 35, 35 (2007) (identifying an increase in scholarly interest in the history of

2009]

THE SIOUX MILITARY COMMISSION OF 1862

747

the first instances in which the United States invoked legal
proceedings in response to an attack on civilians, 14 one might expect
a rigorous analysis of the origins of this commission.
Instead, only a handful of scholars have sought to explain
why the United States responded with legal proceedings at a time
when the law of war, customary practices, and indeed public
sentiment, sanctioned the use of military retaliation, including
collective reprisals and summary executions. 5 Accounts of the
general history of military commissions have, in some cases,
overlooked the Sioux military commission entirely, 16 while those that
military commissions following September 11, 2001). Since September 2001, 201
law review articles have been published with either "military commission" or
"military tribunal" in the title; no such articles had been published in the seven
years prior to 2001. Westlaw Search performed February 23, 2009.
14.
The Sioux military commission was not the first time that the U.S.
Army employed legal proceedings when responding to attacks on civilians. See
William B. Skelton, An American Profession of Arms: The Army Officer Corps,
1784-1861, at 322 (1992). The army also employed legal proceedings during the
Mexican-American War of 1845-48, when General Winfield Scott convened
"councils of war" to try members of enemy forces for alleged violations of the laws
of war. See David Glazier, PrecedentsLost: The Neglected History of the Military
Commission, 46 Va. J. Int'l L. 5, 30-39 (2005) (describing the creation of the
military commission during the Mexican-American War and the establishment of
councils of war); see also William Winthrop, Military Law and Precedents 129899 (1896) (explaining that only a few councils of war were convened during the
Mexican-American War). For a discussion of historical precedents of the Sioux
military commission, see infra notes 62-66 and accompanying text.
15.
See infra text accompanying notes 49-57 (discussing collective
reprisals), text accompanying notes 115-120 (discussing summary executions).
16.
See, e.g., Leonard Cutler, The Rule of Law and the Law of War:
Military Commissions and Enemy Combatants Post 9/11, at 3-15 (2005)
(summarizing the history of military commissions without reference to the Sioux
military commission); Thomas H. Moreland, Indefinite Detention of "Enemy
Combatants," in The Imperial Presidency and the Consequences of 9/11, at 91,
109-17 (James R. Silkenat & Mark R. Shulman eds., 2007) (same); David J.
Barron & Martin S. Lederman, The Commander in Chief at the Lowest EbbFraming the Problem, Doctrine, and Original Understanding,121 Harv. L. Rev.
689, 717 n.81 (2008) (same); Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, The
Constitutional Validity of Military Commissions, 5 Green Bag 249, 250-52 (2002)
(same); Michael 0. Lacey, Military Commissions: A HistoricalSurvey, 2002 Army
Lawyer 41, 42-47 (2002) (same); Jill K. Lamson, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld and the
Government's Response: The Military Commissions Act of 2006 and Its
Implications on the Separation of Powers, 39 U. Tol. L. Rev. 497, 506-07 (2008)
(same); Paul Taylor, The Historicaland Legal Norms Governing the Detention of
Suspected Terroristsand the Risks Posed by Recent Efforts to Depart From Them,
12 Tex. Rev. L. & Pol. 223, 227-28 (2008) (same).
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do reference the commission have tended to focus on a normative
assessment of the procedures, rather than the reasons why the
United States convened the commission in the first place. 17 Likewise,
accounts of the United States-Sioux war generally describe the Sioux
military commission without inquiring why it was held.18
Those scholars who have delved further into the commission's
underlying rationales have reached varying conclusions. Some
historians have suggested that Colonel Sibley convened the
commission as part of a larger project of punishment and
vengeance. 9 Roy W. Meyer, for example, suggests that the military
organized the commission as a means of satisfying "the popular
demand for retribution" by punishing those enemy forces who were
readily available since the "most clearly guilty among the Sioux were
scattered over the prairies to the west," and thus, out of reach.2 °
Carol Chomsky, in her detailed critique of the commission's
procedures, suggests that Sibley chose trials over forced removal

17.
See, e.g., Louis Fischer, supra note 8, at 51-55 (2007) (describing the
Sioux military commission without examining why the military did not resort to
reprisal or summary executions); Peter Judson Richards, Extraordinary Justice:
Military Tribunals in Historical and International Context 30-31 (2007) (same);
Beery, supra note 8, at 789 n.54 (same); Belknap, supra note 8, at 452-53 (same);
David Glazier, Kangaroo Court or Competent Tribunal?:Judging the 21st Century
Military Commission, 89 Va. L. Rev. 2005, 2044-45 (2003) (same); Jody Prescott,
Military Commissions, Past and Future, Mil. Rev., Mar.-Apr. 2003, at 42, 45;
Vagts, supra note 13, at 39 (same). Notably, Professor Glazier makes the sound
point that although scholars have raised legitimate concerns about the unfairness
of the procedures, "arguably, more significant was the insistence on providing
trials at all, given previous views that 'savages' could be summarily executed."
Glazier, supra note 14, at 39-40.
18.
For accounts that describe the Sioux military commission without
inquiring why it was held, see Kenneth Carley, The Sioux Uprising of 1862, at
62-63 (1961); William M. Osborn, The Wild Frontier 206 (2000); Robert M. Utley,
Frontiersmen in Blue: The U.S. Army and the Indian 1848-1865, at 269 (1967);
Robert M. Utley & Wilcomb E. Washburn, The American Heritage History of the
Indian Wars 204 (First Mariner Books ed., 2002).
19.
Micheal Clodfelter, The Dakota War: The United States Army Versus
the Sioux, 1862-1865, at 57 (1998) (briefly describing the appointment of the
military commission and stating that "the real work ... was vengeance"); Louis
H. Roddis, The Indian Wars of Minnesota 147 (1956) (briefly describing the
appointment of the military commission and implying that it was established as a
means to "punish the warriors"); Meyer, supra note 3, at 125.
20.
Meyer, supra note 3, at 125.
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because he had been trained in the law and wanted to provide the
defendants with some degree of due process.21
These accounts are consistent with a broader theory that
scholars have put forward to explain the emergence of military
commissions in general, namely, that the commission emerged as a
substitute for an otherwise unavailable court of law.22 According to
21.
Chomsky, supra note 8, at 93 ("[Sibley's] training as a lawyer, however,
would suggest not that he punish the Dakota by removing them to a distant
reservation, as was frequently done, but that he try them for their crimes."); see
also William Watts Folwell, Minnesota: The North Star State 227 (1908)
(describing Pope's plans to exterminate the Sioux and explaining that Sibley "was
too humane and judicious to give serious regard to so insane a proposal"); Rhonda
R. Gilman, Henry Hastings Sibley: Divided Heart 185 (2004) ("Drum-head justice
it was, as Sibley freely admitted. Yet his ingrained sense of legal propriety
demanded some color-of-law, even in the disposal of those deemed maniacs and
wild beasts."). Notably, however, Sibley had elected not to pursue a career in law.
As Sibley explained in his unpublished autobiography: "My father intended me to
follow his profession, but after [two years of study], I frankly told him that the
study was irksome to me, and I longed for a more active and stirring life."
Gilman, supra, at 20 (quoting Sibley's autobiography).
22.
See, e.g., Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 590-91 (2006) (surveying
scholarly views on military commissions and concluding that "[glenerally ...the
need for military commissions during this period-as during the Mexican Warwas driven largely by the then very limited jurisdiction of courts-martial");
William W. Winthrop, Digest of Opinions of the Judge Advocate General of the
Army 325 (1880) ("[Military commissions are] simply criminal war-courts,
resorted to for the reason that the jurisdiction of Courts Martial ...is restricted
by law, and cannot be extended to include certain classes of offenses ... which in
war would go unpunished in the absence of a provisional forum for the trial of the
offenders."); Eun Young Choi, Veritas, Not Vengeance: An Examination of the
Evidentiary Rules For Military Commissions in the War Against Terrorism, 42
Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 139, 140 (2007) ("Military courts were traditionally
regarded as courts of necessity, only to be convened temporarily by commanders
inwar zones.., where no other courts were open or had jurisdiction."); Chomsky,
supra note 8, at 63 ("The army began to use military commissions during the
Mexican Wars as a way of conducting what the commanding officers viewed as
necessary trials involving individuals and offenses not specified by statute as
being subject to court-martial."); Louis Fischer, Military Commissions: Problems
of Authority and Practice,B.U. Int'l L.J. 15, 26 (2006) ("During the United States'
Civil War, military commissions were established initially to address crimes and
military offenses . . . not triable or punishable by courts-martial and . . . not

within the jurisdiction of any existing civil court."); David Glazier, A Self-Inflicted
Wound: A Half-Dozen Years of Turmoil Over the Guantanamo Military
Commissions, 12 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 131, 136, 140-41 (explaining that
General Winfield Scott created military commissions during the MexicanAmerican War to "fill a critical statutory gap in the UCMJ's predecessor" and
referring to the "historic commission use as a jurisdictional gap-filler"); Gabor
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this theory, which Justice Stevens endorsed in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,
officers in the Mexican-American War and Civil War began using
military commissions to try enemy defendants charged with law of
war violations because no other forum was available; the tribunal
that militaries had traditionally set up in the field-the courtmartial-was statutorily reserved for disciplining one's own troops.23
Although different in name, the new tribunal-the military
commission-would use the same processes as the court-martial, and
thus "protect against abuse and assure evenhandedness under the
pressures of war."24 As Louis Fischer explained in a brief to the
Supreme Court, military commissions "have traditionally been used
as an emergency measure by a commander in the field to fill a
temporary gap created by the absence of civilian court or courtmartial jurisdiction. 25
While these explanations provide a helpful starting point in
explaining why Sibley convened the Sioux military commission, they
raise two further questions.
First, if the purpose of the commission was to satisfy popular
demand for retribution, why did the military not simply execute its
plans of extermination, or alternatively, immediately execute those
who had surrendered? The nineteenth-century common law of war
sanctioned such forms of retaliation against enemies who failed to
comply with the prevailing norms of "civilized nations."26 Indeed,
when Francis Lieber drafted the first codification of the laws of war
in 1863, he deemed retaliation lawful, provided that it was used as a
measure of last resort.27 Thus, if an enemy force wantonly killed
unarmed non-combatants, early American military commanders

Rona, Legal Issues in the "War on Terrorism"--Reflecting on the Conversation
Between Silja N.U. Voneky and John Bellinger, 9 German L.J. 711, 732 (2008)

("Historically, military commissions have been appropriately relegated to times
and places where the normal machinery of the judiciary is unavailable or

dysfunctional.").
23.
24.

See discussion supra note 22.
Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 617.

25.

Brief for Louis Fischer as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 2,

Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006) (No. 05-184), 2005 WL 2178809; see

also Gilman, supra note 21, at 185 (describing the Sioux military commission as
an alternative to "premptory executions" when state courts were not available).
26.

See infra text accompanying notes 49-57.

27.
Francis Lieber, General Order No. 100: Instructions
Government of Armies of the United States in the Field 9 (1863).

for the
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could, and often did, respond in kind or by summarily executing
enemy prisoners.2 8
Second, if the goal was instead to create a substitute for a
court-martial and provide some degree of due process, a goal that
seems plausible in light of Sibley's long-standing friendship with
members of the Sioux,2 9 how do we reconcile this with Sibley's initial
plans to "begin my work upon [the Sioux] with fire and sword,""
whom he referred to as "devils in human shape", 3' and his later
threats to "destroy [Sioux] men, women, and children, alike"32 and
"cut them to pieces?"3 3 In other words, how do we reconcile Sibley's
professed initial goal of total war and announcement that his "heart
is hardened against [the Sioux] beyond any touch of mercy"34 with his
chosen means of legal process?
II. REVISITING THE ORIGINS AND GOALS OF THE SIOUX MILITARY
COMMISSION
Circumstances Prompting the Sioux Military Commission
of 1862

A.

When Colonel Sibley set out on August 20, 1862, with plans
to kill the Sioux, 35 the United States faced, in the eyes of many, an
28.
29.

See infra text accompanying notes 49-57.
Clodfelter, supra note 19, at 50 (describing Sibley's close, twenty-year

friendship with the Sioux).
30.
Letter from Henry H. Sibley, Colonel,

Commanding

Military

Expedition, Minn. State Militia, to Sarah Sibley (Aug. 24, 1862), in Extracts from

General Sibley's Letters to his Wife, Written on the Indian Campaign (R.J.
Holcombe ed., 1893), microformed on Henry H. Sibley Papers, Film M164, Reel 11
(Yale Univ.) [hereinafter Sibley Papers].
31.
Id.
32.
Letter from Henry H. Sibley, Brigadier Gen., Commanding Dist. of
Minn., Gen. Staff, U.S. Volunteers, to John H. Pope, Major Gen., Gen. Staff, U.S.

Volunteers & Brigadier Gen., Commanding Dep't of the Nw., Gen. Staff, U.S.
Army (Oct. 3, 1862), in 13 OR, supra note 4, at 707, 707-08.

33.

Letter from Henry H. Sibley, Brigadier Gen., Commanding Dist. of

Minn., Gen. Staff, U.S. Volunteers, to John H. Pope, Major Gen., Gen. Staff, U.S.

Volunteers & Brigadier Gen., Commanding Dep't of the Nw., Gen. Staff, U.S.
Army (Oct. 5, 1862), in 13 OR, supra note 4, at 711, 711-12.
34.
Letter from Henry H. Sibley to Sarah Sibley (Aug. 24, 1862), supra note
30.
35.

Carley, supra note 18, at 36-37; see Letter from Henry H. Sibley to

Sarah Sibley (Aug. 24, 1862), supra note 30.
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unprecedented threat. Eleven years earlier, four of the seven tribes
that composed the Sioux Nation-the Mdewakantons, Sissetons,
Wahpetons, and Wahpekutes-had agreed to sell their ancestral
homelands to the United States and move to a reservation stretching
along the Minnesota River valley, in exchange for a fixed sum to be
paid in annual installments.3 6
Despite the United States' assurances, conditions on the
reservation had steadily deteriorated as corrupt federal agents
withheld or diverted payments and inflated prices on goods intended
for distribution. 37 By 1862, following an especially harsh winter,
many families on the reservation were forced to the brink of
starvation and instructed to "eat grass." 38 Betrayed, angry, and
desperate, members of the Mdewakanton soldiers lodge-a tribal
institution employed in organizing hunts and political activismbegan to plan the attacks of August 1862. 39
From the perspective of at least some state and federal
officials, these attacks signaled the potential unraveling of American
hegemony. By August 30, 1862, an American officer reported that
"[t] here never was a time in the history of the country when so many
tribes distant from and hostile to each other were exhibiting hostility

36.
For a discussion of the treaty negotiations of 1851 between the United
States and the Mdewakantons, Wahpekutes, Sissetons, and Wahpetons, see
Anderson, supra note 2, at 58-74.
See Dakota Eyes, supra note 1, at 19-20.
37.
38.
Robert Hakewaste's Testimony, in Dakota Eyes, supra note 1, at 31, 33
(recalling that the government agent had advised the families that they could
"eat grass").
Anderson, supra note 2, at 116-17, 130-34. Although it is not within
39.
the scope of this Note to examine the origins of the conflict in detail, first-hand
accounts from three Mdewakantons who were involved in the conflict, Jerome Big
Eagle ("Wamditanka"), Joseph Wabasha, and Robert Hakewaste, provide a good
overview of Mdewakanton perspectives on the causes of war and are reprinted in
Dakota Eyes, supra note 1, at 21-33. See also Letter from Henry H. Sibley,
Colonel, Commanding Military Expedition, Minn. State Militia, to Oscar
Malmros, Adjutant Gen. of Minn. (Sept. 8, 1862), in St. Paul Daily Press, Sept.
11, 1862 (citing a letter from the presumed leader of the attacks as stating that
the Sioux commenced the war after the United States failed to comply with its
treaty obligations, leaving children to die of starvation); Where the Responsibility
Lies, Mankato Semi-Wkly. Rec., Nov. 1, 1862, at 2 (asserting that the Indian
massacre was "caused wholly by the dishonesty of the [Federal] Indian
superintendent and agents").
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to the whites."40 In mid-September, Iowa's Governor received
intelligence that "the whole Sioux Nation is bound for a war of
extermination against the frontier.""' As reports of the death-toll
continued to climb,42 families abandoned their homes, leaving behind
predictions that it was only a matter of time before the Union would
be forced to cede control of Minnesota's frontier. 3
1.

The Initial Plan of Response: A War of
Extermination

After news of the attacks arrived in St. Paul, government and
military officials immediately advocated a war of extermination as
the preferred response. President Abraham Lincoln's secretary, who
was coincidentally visiting Minnesota, reported to the Secretary of

Letter from James Craig, Brigadier Gen., Commanding Dist. of Neb.,
40.
Gen. Staff, U.S. Volunteers, to James G. Blunt, Brigadier Gen., Commanding
Dist. of Kan., Gen. Staff, U.S. Volunteers (Aug. 30, 1862), in 13 OR, supra note 4,
at 607, 607-08.
Letter from H. C. Nutt, Lieutenant Colonel & Aide-de-Camp, Iowa
41.
State Militia, to Samuel J. Kirkwood, Governor of Iowa (Sept. 16, 1862), in 13
OR, supra note 4, at 638, 640.
42.
See Meyer, supra note 3; see also Carley, supra note 18, at 11 (stating
that "in terms of the number of lives lost, the outbreak was the worst in
American history."); Clodfelter, supra note 19, at 41 (estimating that on August
18 alone, four hundred civilians were killed throughout southwestern Minnesota);
Dakota Eyes, supra note 1, at 1, 14 (estimating that about four hundred civilians
lost their lives in the first four days of fighting); Chomsky, supra note 8, at 21-22
(1990) (estimating that "in thirty-seven days of fighting . .approximately 358
settlers ... had been killed.").

See Ignatius Donnely, Letter to the Editor, St. Paul Daily Press, Aug.
43.
28, 1862, at 1 (describing widespread panic); Letter from John H. Pope to Henry
W. Halleck (Sept. 23, 1862), supra note 4 (describing the threat of depopulation
and emphasizing the need to restore confidence). But see Alexander Ramsey,
Proclamation to the People of the State (1862), in St. Paul Daily Press, Aug. 23,
1862, at 1 (assuring Minnesotans that the "force of [Sioux] violence will fall upon
the scattered habitations along the western frontier" and that the Sioux would
not "invade the more thickly settled parts of the State"); ExaggeratedRumors and
Reports, St. Paul Daily Press, Aug. 26, 1862, at 1 ("We have thousands of men in
the State . . .who are more than a match for the [the Sioux] in all the arts of
Indian warfare. Our citizens may rest assured that the irregular forces now in
the field are ample for the present emergency .

. . .");

The Origin and Extent of

Our Indian Difficulties, St. Paul Daily Press, Aug. 28, 1862, at 1 ("Let Col. Sibley
then abandon these panic bred chimeras of vast armies of Indians, and move
forward at once to mete out to the rascals the just punishment of their crimes.").
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War that "against the Sioux it must be a war of extermination."44
General John H. Pope, the commander of the newly formed
Minnesota Department, also advocated a campaign of vigorous
warfare: "I think as we have the men and means now we had best
put a final stop to Indian troubles by exterminating or ruining all the
Indians engaged in the late outbreak," he advised Sibley.4 5 Sibley
shared this enthusiasm; five days after receiving his appointment to
lead the expedition,46 he announced his strategy: "I hope to overtake
and kill a thousand or more of the savages
. . . and drive the
47
remainder across the Missouri or to the devil."
Although these calls for
at least one missionary,
extermination,4 8 the American
exterminatory response were in

violence were tempered by calls from
who warned against complete
officials who advocated this type of
good historical company.

44.
Letter from John Nicolay, Private Sec'y to President Abraham Lincoln,
to Edwin M. Stanton, U.S. Sec'y of War (Aug. 27, 1862), in 13 OR, supra note 4,
at 599, 599-600. The Governor, in turn, announced that "[tihe Sioux Indians of
Minnesota must be exterminated or driven forever beyond the borders of the
State." Governor Ramsey's Message, Chi. Trib., Sept. 17, 1862, at 3. A few days
later, Minnesota's Lieutenant Governor reported to the Governor that, "[w]ith
prompt action [the Sioux] can be exterminated or driven beyond the State line."
Ignatius Donnelly, Report of Lieutenant Governor Donnelly (Aug. 29 1862), in
Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs for the Year 1862, at 59, 68 (1863);
see also Minnesota and the Indian War, N.Y. Evangelist, Oct. 9, 1862, at 1
(alluding to the "general wish for the utter extermination of the race").
45.
Letter from John H. Pope, Major Gen., Gen. Staff, U.S. Volunteers &
Brigadier Gen., Commanding Dep't of the Nw., Gen. Staff, U.S. Army, to Henry
H. Sibley, Colonel, Commanding Military Expedition, Minn. State Militia (Sept.
17, 1862), in 13 OR, supra note 4, at 648, 649.
46.
See 2 William Watts Folwell, A History of Minnesota 147-48 (1961)
(describing Sibley's appointment).
47.
Letter from Henry H. Sibley to Sarah Sibley (Aug. 24, 1862), supra note
30.
48.
See Thomas Williamson, Letter to the Editor (Aug. 29, 1862), in
Stephen R. Riggs Papers, Minn. Historical Soc'y, St. Paul, Minn. [hereinafter
Riggs Papers] ("Some say, exterminate them all; but to do this will be both foolish
and wicked."); see also Martha T. Riggs, Letter to the Editor (Sept. 26, 1862), in
Riggs Papers, supra ("And yet there are many who curse this people, and cry,
'Exterminate the fiends.' Dare we, as a nation, thus bring a curse upon ourselves
and on future generations.").
49.
For a description of Native American warfare and early American
military responses, see generally John Grenier, The First Way of War: American
War Making on the Frontier, 1607-1814, at 16-86 (2005) (detailing early
American military traditions that developed in response to the varied ways that
Indians waged war, including extirpative war, hanging, and scalp hunting);
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Since colonial times, commanders responding to attacks on
civilians had repeatedly resorted to indiscriminately killing Native
Americans. Perhaps the most infamous example of a collective
reprisal can be found in Captain John Mason's response to a 1637
Pequot raid on Connecticut farmers which left nine settlers dead.5 °
As punishment, Mason found a Pequot village, announced "we must
on fire.51 The
burn them," and lit the fort and its sleeping inhabitants
2
children.
and
women,
men,
of
hundreds
fire killed
Such responses were not limited to colonial warfare. In 1850,
over two hundred years later and on the opposite coast, Lieutenant
Nathaniel Lyon led a campaign in Northern California that "twice
trapped large groups of Indians on islands, then killed scores of men,
women and children," in a venue Lyon later described as a "perfect
slaughter pen."53 A year later, General Ethan Allen Hitchcock, the
commander of the Department of the Pacific, dispatched troops to
"punish the Coquilles" after reports surfaced that a party of Coquilles
had killed five American explorers in Oregon. 4 The following month,
troops traveled up the Coquille River and, after spotting an Indian

Bernard W. Sheehan, Seeds of Extinction: Jeffersonian Philanthropy and the
American Indian 205 (1973) (describing how Virginians and New Englanders
followed a "policy of extermination" in retaliation for Native American attacks on
colonial settlements); Armstrong Starkey, European and Native American
Warfare, 1675-1815, at 6, 17-35 (1998) (describing the Native Americans' use of
ambushes, guerrilla tactics, and lack of distinction between civilians and
soldiers).
50.
For an early account of the attack and colonists' response, see Thomas
Prince, Introduction to John Mason, A Brief History of the Pequot War i, iii-iv
(1736); see also Grenier, supra note 49, at 27-28 (describing Mason's May 1637
attack on Pequot women, children, and old men); Utley & Washburn, supra note
18, at 25 (describing how, in September 1675, a combined force from Maryland
and Virginia murdered five Susquehannock chiefs who were suspected of recent
frontier murders).
John Mason, A Brief History of the Pequot War 7-8 (1736).
51.
See Isaac V.D. Heard, History of the Sioux War and Massacres of 1862
52.
and 1863, at 271 (1864) (estimating six hundred deaths); Francis Jennings, The
Invasion of America: Indians, Colonialism, and the Cant of Conquest 225 (1975)
(estimating anywhere from three hundred to seven hundred Pequot deaths). In
1675, Massachusetts soldiers engaged in a similar act of collective reprisal,
killing hundreds of women and children in retaliation for an attack on settlers.
See A Farther Brief and True Narration of the Late Wars Risen in New-England
9-10 (1676) (describing the "firing" of five hundred wigwams).
Skelton, supra note 14, at 321.
53.
54.
See Ray H. Glassley, Pacific Northwest Indian Wars 59-60 (1953)
(describing the attack and military response).
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encampment, killed fifteen people within a few minutes.5 5 Four years
later, in 1855, Colonel William S. Harney responded to a Sioux
attack on an Army detachment in Nebraska by looking for a suitably
large Sioux village to punish.56 Upon discovering a camp of teepees,
he and his men pounded the village with artillery, killing eighty-five
men, women, and children.57
Although the U.S. Army issued "few fixed guidelines"
governing conduct toward native tribes, these actions reflected a
broad
sentiment
among
nineteenth-century
officers
that
indiscriminant retaliation against Native Americans was an
acceptable form of warfare." As William B. Skelton documents in his
study of U.S. Army officers' attitudes towards Native Americans, the
military's relationship to Native Americans was characterized both
by compassion and a "readiness to use force," as expressed in
teachings at West Point,5 9 military orders, 60 and the remarks of one
officer who insisted in 1850 that "the surest, and, in the end, the most
humane, preventive is retaliation, not only on
the offenders in
6
person, but upon the tribes to which they belong." 1
These nineteenth-century campaigns of retaliatory violence
were not, however, immune from censure.62 Nor were they the only
way in which officers responded to attacks on civilians. In the 1850s,
it was "surprisingly common" for officers in the Pacific Northwest to
resort to "hasty military trials." 63 For example, in July of 1855, Major
55.
Id. at 60.
56.
Clodfelter, supra note 19, at 19.
57.
Id. at 19-20.
58.
Skelton, supra note 14, at 305-06.
59.
Id. at 319 (quoting Dennis Hart Mahan as advising his students at
West Point that, in the event of hostilities, they should "strike such a blow that it
shall be handed down as memorable in the traditions of the Tribe").
60.
Id. at 321 (quoting Colonel William J. Worth, the newly appointed
commander of the Florida campaign against the Seminoles, as instructing his
officers in 1841 to "[flind the enemy, capture, or exterminate").
61.
Id. at 316 (quoting Lieutenant William H.C. Whiting in his March 14,
1850 letter to Brevet Captain George Deas) (emphasis in original).
62.
See id. at 315-16 (explaining that during the 1850s, "officers almost
universally denounced" settlers and miners who exploited and slaughtered the
Western Indians and accused civil officers and militia leaders of "conducting wars
of extermination").
63.
Id. at 322. Skelton also cites a secohd instance in which officers in the
Pacific Northwest convened a commission to try captured Indians accused of
participating in attacks on civilians. Id. An account of this 1856 Cascade military
commission, in which nine of thirteen Cascade warriors were sentenced and
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Granville 0. Haller convened a "board of officers, or as Major Haller
call[ed] it, a military commission" in the Oregon Territory to try four
captured Wenneste warriors accused of participating in a massacre of
immigrants on the Bois6 river the previous August.M The four
prisoners pled guilty to the charge of "being present, and in some
degree, [having] participated in the massacre of immigrants." 65 After
brief proceedings lasting less than a day, the commission found three
defendants guilty; the fourth was shot and killed while attempting to
escape.66 The following day, the commanding officer ordered the
defendants to be hanged at the "grave of the massacred
immigrants. " 67
Although this 1855 military commission in the Oregon
Territory reveals that the U.S. Army's response to attacks on
civilians was more complex than one of force alone, the pattern of
organized violence that preceded it makes clear that the 1862 plan to
exterminate the Sioux was not without historical precedent.
2.

The Dilemma: A Temporarily Impossible War of
Extermination

Despite Sibley's professed eagerness to implement the
extermination strategy his forebears had pursued, he quickly
discovered that his options for doing so were limited. Throughout
September, and particularly on the day he announced his decision to
convene a military commission, Sibley expressed his inability to wage
an effective offensive pursuit.
The first problem, and one that Sibley recognized almost
immediately, was a severe shortage of essential supplies, including

hung, may be found in Phillip H. Sheridan, 1 Personal Memoirs of P.H. Sheridan

80-84 (1888).
Letter from John E. Wool, Major Gen., Commanding Dep't of the
64.
Pacific, Gen. Staff, U.S. Army, to L. Thomas, U.S. Assistant Adjutant Gen. (Sept.
4, 1855), in S. Exec. Doc. No. 34-26, at 11, 11 (1856).
See Proceedings of a Military Commission Convened at the Camp at
65.
Fort Boisg, O.T., July 17, 1855, reprinted in S. Exec. Doc. No. 34-26, at 12, 13-19

(1856).
See Orders No. 6 (July 18, 1855), excerpted in S. Exec. Doc. No. 34-26,
66.
at 19 (1856).
Id. (approving the proceedings of the military commission and ordering
67.
the executions as "an example, in hopes it will prevent other murders, and not

from the instinct of revenge").

758

COLUMBIA HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW

[40:743

men, food, horses, guns, and bullets.68 Other observers agreed,
concluding that sending the dispatch of infantry to hunt down the
Sioux was a "useless" 69 and even "ludicrous" measure. 70 As one
commentator remarked, "[iut . . . was probably about as poorly an
equipped army as ever entered the field to face what I regard as the
best warriors that ever fought on the North American continent."7'
Indeed, two weeks into the campaign, after Sioux forces had
ambushed his command twice, Sibley simply refused to advance
until he received additional supplies.73
A shortage of supplies was not the only difficulty. Officers
reported that the Sioux enjoyed a considerable strategic advantage,
based on their mobility and superior knowledge of the terrain.74 For
much of the expedition, Sibley never had a clear idea of where the
enemy had encamped.75 Even when he did, concerns for the safety of
68.
For letters describing the shortage of ammunition and rations, see
Letter from Henry H. Sibley to Sarah Sibley (Aug. 24, 1862), supra note 30;
Letter from Henry H. Sibley, Colonel, Commanding Military Expedition, Minn.
State Militia, to Sarah Sibley (Aug. 29, 1862), in Sibley Papers, supra note 30;
Letter from Henry H. Sibley, Colonel, Commanding Military Expedition, Minn.
State Militia, to Sarah Sibley (Sept. 2, 1862), in Sibley Papers, supra note 30.
69.
Letter from James H. Baker, Minn. Sec'y of State, to Christopher P.
Wolcott, U.S. Assistant Sec'y of War (Aug. 21, 1862), in 13 OR, supra note 4, at
590, 591.
70.
Charles Johnson, Narrative of the Sixth Regiment, in 1 Minnesota in
the Civil and Indian Wars 1861-1865, at 300, 304-05 (1890) [hereinafter 1
Minnesota in the Civil and Indian Wars].
71.
Charles E. Flandrau, The Indian War of 1862-1864, and Following
Campaigns in Minnesota, in 1 Minnesota in the Civil and Indian Wars, supra
note 70, at 727, 735.
72.
Letter from Henry H. Sibley, Colonel, Commanding Military
Expedition, Minn. State Militia, to Sarah Sibley (Sept. 7, 1862), in Sibley Papers,
supra note 30 (explaining how Little Crow had killed eighteen soldiers, wounded
forty, and left all but two horses standing).
73.
Id. (explaining that he could not continue onward because he lacked
essential supplies).
74.
Letter from Stephen R. Riggs, Reverend, to Alexander Ramsey,
Governor of Minn. (Sept. 8, 1862), in 2 Minnesota in the Civil and Indian Wars,
1861-1865, at 226, 227 (1893) [hereinafter 2 Minnesota in the Civil and Indian
Wars] (observing that "[alt present the Indians have all the advantages of this
war. Their passing with certainty from place to place on horseback, their mode of
shooting and flying, their perfect knowledge of the country, its ravines and hiding
places, their bushwhacking and ambushing, all give them a decided advantage in
fighting with our troops").
75.
For example, on August 29, Sibley expressed his hope that the Sioux
were entrenching at Little Crow's village, as it would give him "an opportunity to
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the estimated 120 settlers whom the Sioux had taken captive during
the attacks cautioned against waging the type of reprisal that
preyious commanders had deployed.76
Thus, even after Sibley received a delivery of much-needed
supplies that allowed him to press onward with the expedition on
September 19, 1862, 7" he continued to express doubts as to whether
victory on the battlefield was possible. These doubts are particularly
evident in his correspondence with his commanding officer, General
Pope. After arriving in St. Paul to assume command in midSeptember, Pope wrote to Sibley and giddily described his detailed
plans for "exterminating or ruining" the Sioux. '9 In Pope's view,
resources were of no concern: "Let me know . . . precisely what you
wish of everything and it shall be sent." In response to this
enthusiastic call for total war, Sibley penned two letters to Pope in

apply a finishing blow to them if they are so concentrated." Letter from Henry H.
Sibley to Sarah Sibley (Aug. 29, 1862), supra note 68. The next day, however,
Sibley's hopes for a "finishing blow" were dashed: Little Crow and his followers
had retreated. Letter from Henry H. Sibley, Colonel, Commanding Military
Expedition, Minn. State Militia, to Sarah Sibley (Aug. 30, 1862), in Sibley Papers,
supra note 30; see also Letter from G.H. Pound, Reverend, to Alexander Ramsey,
Governor of Minn. (Sept. 8, 1862), in St. Paul Daily Press, Sept. 11, 1862, at 1
("The Indians will attack, only when we think them to lie thirty miles off ....
[They] will be able to describe our position so accurately that every Indian who
hears it, can approach us precisely at the point he wishes to in the dark.").
Letter from Henry H. Sibley to Oscar Malmros (Sept. 8, 1862), supra
76.
note 39, at 1 ("I am very much anxious to secure the safety of the many prisoners
before attacking the camp, as they will doubtless be placed in the most exposed
situations."); see also Letter from Henry H. Sibley, Colonel, Commanding Military
Expedition, Minn. State Militia, to John H. Pope, Major Gen., Gen. Staff, U.S.
Volunteers & Brigadier Gen., Commanding Dep't of the Nw., Gen. Staff, U.S.
Army (Sept. 19, 1862), in 13 OR, supra note 4, at 651, 652 (describing his anxiety
about the fate of the captives); Letter from Henry H. Sibley, Colonel,
Commanding Military Expedition, Minn. State Militia, to Sarah Sibley (Sep. 10,
1862), in Sibley Papers, supra note 30 (worrying that if Sibley made an advance
movement, "two or three hundred white women and children might be murdered
in cold blood").
77.
Letter from Henry H. Sibley, Colonel, Commanding Military
Expedition, Minn. State Militia, to Oscar Malmros, Adjutant Gen. of Minn. (Sept.
13, 1862), in 13 OR, supra note 4, at 631, 631 (describing recent arrival of new
troops and rations); see also Carley, supra note 18, at 57 (describing the influx of
new supplies).
78.
See Clodfelter, supra note 19, at 45.
Letter from John H. Pope to Henry H. Sibley (Sept. 17, 1862), supra
79.
note 45, at 649.
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which he tactfully suggested that Pope was in need of a reality
check.8 °
The Sioux, Sibley reminded Pope, were "the most warlike and
powerful of the tribes on this continent." 81 And, the United States,
Sibley explained, had been in a bind: "At one time we have wanted
bullets and at another bread."8 2 Although Sibley was optimistic that
he could "whip" the Indians, such a defeat could only occur, he
explained, if the Indians opted to fight. Otherwise, Little Crow
(Taoyateduta), the presumed leader of the attacks, could "escape
from us if he chooses to do so."84 Moreover, Pope's "admirable" plans
to send additional forces were unlikely to help the situation.85
Collective reprisals, it seemed, were no longer an assured means of
preserving control of the frontier.
3.

A Back-Up Plan: Calibrating the Scale of War

After Pope received Sibley's dour assessment of the United
States' prospects for defeating the Sioux on the battlefield, he turned
his attention toward dredging up the resources needed to wage a war
of extermination. 6 While Pope tried unsuccessfully to secure supplies
from Washington,87 Sibley had begun to follow a different strategy:
80.
Letter from Henry H. Sibley to John H. Pope (Sept. 19, 1862), supra
note 76, at 651.
81.
Id.
82.
Id.
83.
Id.
84.
Id.
85.
Id. at 652 (explaining that Pope's plans would "partially fail" because of
the difficulty of organizing large-scale expeditions with new troops and the,
impending cold weather).
86.
See, e.g., Letter from John H. Pope to Henry W. Halleck (Sept. 23,
1862), supra note 4, at 664 (asserting that Pope was acting as "vigorously" as he
could but that "there is positively nothing here"); Letter from John H. Pope,
Major Gen., Gen. Staff, U.S. Volunteers & Brigadier Gen., Commanding Dep't of
the Nw., Gen. Staff, U.S. Army, to Edwin M. Stanton, U.S. Sec'y of War (Sept. 22,
1862), in 13 OR, supra note 4, at 658, 658 (complaining that "[t]here are neither
troops nor arms, and the Governor calls on me for both," and requesting
additional supplies).
87.
See, e.g., Letter from Henry W. Halleck, Major Gen., Gen.-in-Chief,
Gen. Staff, U.S. Army, to John H. Pope, Major Gen., Gen. Staff, U.S. Volunteers
& Brigadier Gen., Commanding Dep't of the Nw., Gen. Staff, U.S. Army (Sept. 23,
1862), in 13 OR, supra note 4, at 663, 663 (denying Pope's request for supplies);
Letter from Edwin M. Stanton, U.S. Sec'y of War, to John H. Pope, Major Gen.,
Gen. Staff, U.S. Volunteers & Brigadier Gen., Commanding Dep't of the Nw.,
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calibrating the scale of war to accommodate existing military
capacity, first via negotiations, and ultimately, via military
commissions.
Sibley's resort to negoitations began in early September.
After an ambush left Sibley with eighteen fewer men, two less
horses, and a conviction that continued advance was impossible,8 8
Sibley buried his men and left a note in a cigar box, tied to a stake,
for Little Crow, inviting him to respond with any "propositions." 9
Although this effort faltered, 90 Sibley soon discovered that he might
have a new negotiating partner: the following week, Sibley learned
that the Sioux force he was unsuccessfully pursuing had split into
two parties.9 1
One faction, composed primarily of the Mdewakantons under
Little Crow, continued to call for hostilities, while a second party,
composed primarily of the Sissetons, Wahpetons, and at least three

Gen. Staff, U.S. Army (Sept. 23, 1862), in 13 OR, supra note 4, at 662, 662-63
(denying Pope's request for supplies); see also Clodfelter, supra note 19, at 47
(describing Pope's failed attempts to secure supplies).
88.
Letter from Henry H. Sibley to Sarah Sibley (Sept. 7, 1862), supra note
72.
89.
Letter from Henry H. Sibley to Oscar Malmros (Sept. 8, 1862), supra
note 39, at 1 (explaining that he had left a note to Little Crow reading, "If Little
Crow has any proposition to make to me, let him send a half breed to me, and he
shall be protected in and out of my camp"); see also Gabriel Renville's Memoir, in
Dakota Eyes, supra note 1, at 186, 188 (describing the response to Sibley's note).
90.
Little Crow responded with a note outlining the number of prisoners
and asking Sibley how he could "make peace for my people." Letter from Little
Crow (Taoyateduta), Mdewakanton Chief, to Henry H. Sibley, Colonel,
Commanding Military Expedition, Minn. State Militia (undated), in Mankato
Semi-Wkly. Rec., Sept. 20, 1862, at 1. For Sibley, however, this was insufficient;
in his reply, he cited continuing murders and imprisonment and noted that "this
is not the way for you to make peace." Letter from Henry H. Sibley, Colonel,
Commanding Military Expedition, Minn. State Militia, to Little Crow
(Taoyateduta), Mdewakanton Chief (Sept. 12, 1862), in Mankato Semi-Wkly.

Rec., Sept. 20, 1862, at 1.
91.
Letter from Henry H. Sibley to Oscar Malmros (Sept. 13, 1862), supra
note 77, at 631 (forwarding reports from the messenger delivering Little Crow's
message that "the Indians are very much divided in sentiment and are quarreling
among themselves" while "those who have opposed the war and taken no part in
it are organizing themselves so as to make a separate camp when the time comes
and claim our protection."); see also Thomas A. Robertson's Reminiscences, in
Dakota Eyes, supra note 1, at 177, 178 ("While we were ostensibly messengers
from Little Crow and the hostiles, I was, in secret, a messenger in the interests of
the friendly element and the release of over 150 prisoners in the hostile camp.").
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Mdewakanton leaders, had established a separate "friendly" camp
and advocated for an immediate cessation of war." On September 12,
1862, Joseph Wabasha, the Mdewakanton leader credited with
having organized the peace party,93 and Taopi, a Mdewakanton
leader who opposed the war from the outset, 94 initiated a dialogue
with Sibley, notifying him that they were prepared to retrieve the
settlers currently held prisoner in the hostile camp, in exchange for
assurances that their camp would not be attacked. 95 Sibley, who had
only twenty-five cavalry and was still hoping for a "couple hundred or
more," accepted this offer.9 ' He wrote in reply:
It is not my purpose to injure any innocent person .... If
you and others who have not been concerned in the
murders and expeditions will gather yourselves with all the
prisoners, on the prairie in full sight of my troops,... then

92.

For a description of the division between the Mdewakantons, Sissetons,

and Wahpetons, see Anderson, supra note 2, at 145-153 (1986). Briefly, members
of the Mdewakanton soldiers lodge led the initial attack on Redwood Agency on
August 18. Id. at 133-35. The Sissetons and Wahpetons, who lived thirty-five
miles north on the Upper Sioux Reservation, were reportedly not involved. See
Martha Riggs, Letter to the Editor (Sept. 26, 1862), supra note 48; see also The
Origin and Extent of Our Indian Difficulties, supra note 43, at 1 (reporting that
the Upper Sioux tribes were not involved in the initial attack on Redwood Agency
and that several of the most influential chiefs of the Mdewakantons were not
aware of the plans of the attack). Three days after the first attack, four hundred
Wahpeton and Sisseton soldiers apparently joined the Mdewakanton offensive.
See Lightning Blanket's Account, in Dakota Eyes, supra note 1, at 153, 156. This
alliance, however, was short-lived: the tribal chiefs of the Upper Sioux tribes
announced that they would not support the war effort on August 28. Anderson,
supra note 2, at 152.
93.
See Dakota Eyes, supra note 1, at 27.
94.
See Taopi's Statement, in Dakota Eyes, supra note 1, at 63, 63-65.
95.
Letter from Wabashaw, Mdewakanton Chief, and Taopee,
Mdewakanton Chief, to Henry H. Sibley, Colonel, Commanding Military
Expedition, Minn. State Militia (Sept. 10, 1862), in Mankato Semi-Wkly. Rec.,
Sept. 20, 1862, at 1. Thomas A. Robertson, who acted as a courier between Sibley
and the friendly camp, later recalled that he transcribed the letter for Good
Thunder (Wakinyanwaste), a Mdewakanton leader who instructed Robertson to
sign the letter from Wabashaw and Taopi. See Thomas Robertson's Narrative, in
Dakota Eyes, supra note 1, at 177, 183; see also Gabriel Renville's Narrative, in
Dakota Eyes, supra note 1, at 186, 191 ("A few of the Medawakantons [sic] felt
inclined towards the whites, and secretly getting Thomas A. Robertson to write a
letter for them, sent it by him to General Sibley. This letter was signed by Taopi,
Good Thunder, and Wabashaw.").
96.
Letter from Henry H. Sibley to Oscar Malmros (Sept. 13, 1862), supra
note 77, at 631.
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you can come
forward and place yourself under my
97
protection.

Two weeks later, after Little Crow's forces launched an
unsuccessful ambush and began to retreat, Sibley received reports
that the peace party had rescued the prisoners, who were now safely
in the friendly camp, awaiting his arrival.98 Happily, Sibley
reiterated his promise of limited warfare, explaining that he would
soon retrieve the prisoners as he was only there to make "war
against the guilty."99 Accordingly, on the afternoon of September 26,
while Little Crow and his followers fled north, Sibley and a small
group of his staff and infantry "paid a formal visit" to the friendly
camp. °0 After shaking hands with the chiefs and giving a series of
speeches, Sibley assembled the women and children prisoners and
escorted them promptly back to camp."'o
In Sibley's view, the meeting was a success. As he wrote to
Pope the following day, he had accomplished two of the key objectives
of the campaign: retrieving the prisoners and checking the threat of
attacks." 2 As Sibley remarked, all that remained was the task of
extermination. There was "nothing left to do but to follow up the

97.
Id. Sibley sent a similar letter addressed to all "Sioux Indians who had
not been concerned in the murder and outrages upon the white settlers,"
repeating the promise of limited warfare. Letter from Henry H. Sibley, Colonel,
Commanding Military Expedition, Minn. State Militia (Sept. 13, 1862), in 13 OR,
supra note 4, at 632, 632.
98.
Letter from Henry H. Sibley, Colonel, Commanding Military
Expedition, Minn. State Militia, to Ma-za-ka-tame, Toopee, and Wake-nan-nan-te
(Sept. 24, 1862), in 13 OR, supra note 4, at 666, 667. For details of Little Crow's
failed ambush, see Carly, supra note 18, at 58-59.
99.
Id. ("I have not come here to make war upon those who are innocent,
but upon those who are guilty."). Later that day, Sibley again announced a plan
of limited warfare, warning the Sissetons that his command would be arriving at
the friendly camp "very soon" and that he had "not come up to make war upon
any bands who have not been concerned in the horrible murders upon the white
people") Letter from Henry H. Sibley, Colonel, Commanding Military Expedition,
Minn. State Militia, to "Ta-Tanka-Narin, Chief of the Siseton-wana and Tah-ton
ka-na-ken-yan, soldiers of Wa-na-tams Band" (Sept. 24, 1862), in 13 OR, supra
note 4, at 667, 667.
100.
Letter from Henry H. Sibley to John H. Pope (Sept. 27, 1862), supra
note 6, at 679.

101.
102.

Id.
Id.
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exterminate

The problem, however, was that at precisely the time that
Sibley was expected to carry on the offensive pursuit of the
Mdewakantons,' °4 he was once again unable to do so. On September
0 5
27, he reported that his men were on the "verge of starvation,"'
while the onset of winter meant that forage would be in short supply
on the plains, rendering an offensive pursuit unwise. 106 Despite
Pope's promise that more rations were on the way,'0 7 he too
concluded that continued pursuit would be difficult. As he reported
with food;
on October 2, "[i]t is next to impossible to supply [Sibley]
0 8
there are no means in my possession or which I can get.",
Abandoning the expedition, however, was also not an option.
Although the immediate threat of frontier attacks appeared to have
passed,'0 9 and although Sibley would have liked to return for

103.
Id. at 680.
104.
Letter from John H. Pope, Major Gen., Gen. Staff, U.S. Volunteers &
Brigadier Gen., Commanding Dep't of the Nw., Gen. Staff, U.S. Army, to Henry
H. Sibley, Colonel, Commanding Military Expedition, Minn. State Militia (Sept.
28, 1862), in 13 OR, supra note 4, at 685, 686; Letter from John H. Pope, Major
Gen., Gen. Staff, U.S. Volunteers & Brigadier Gen., Commanding Dep't of the
Nw., Gen. Staff, U.S. Army, to Henry W. Halleck, Major Gen., Gen.-in-Chief, Gen.
Staff, U.S. Army (Oct. 4, 1862), in 13 OR, supra note 4, at 709, 709 (urging the
need for a strong force to be kept during the winter).
105.
Letter from Henry H. Sibley to John H. Pope (Sept. 27, 1862), supra
note 6, at 680.
106.
See The Sioux War: What Shall We Do With It?; The Sioux Indians:
What Shall We Do With Them?, St. Paul Daily Press, Oct. 21, 1862, at 1
(reporting that "the season is too far advanced for the effective pursuit of Little
Crow" and suggesting that "[ilf the months of November, December and January
are too severe for field operations, they can be made none the less available to
organize a spring campaign").
107.
Letter from John H. Pope to Henry H. Sibley (Sept. 28, 1862), supra
note 104, at 686.
108.
Letter from John H. Pope, Major Gen., Gen. Staff, U.S. Volunteers &
Brigadier Gen., Commanding Dep't of the Nw., Gen. Staff, U.S. Army, to Henry
W. Halleck, Major. Gen., Gen.-in-Chief, Gen. Staff, U.S. Army (Oct. 2, 1862), in
13 OR, supra note 4, at 705, 706 (explaining that pursuit was temporarily
impossible).
109.
See Carley, supra note 18, at 59 (describing the decisiveness of Wood
Lake and return of the captives); Roddis, supra note 19, at 139 (asserting that the
victory at Wood Lake marked the end of the uprising); Letter from Henry H.
Sibley, Colonel, Commanding Military Expedition, Minn. State Militia, to Sarah
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personal reasons," ° Pope was adamant that extermination was still
necessary and worried that the "whole of the annuity Indians are
restless.""1 As he instructed Sibley on September 28, "There will be
no peace in this region by virtue of treaties and Indian faith. It is my
purpose utterly to exterminate the Sioux, if I have the power to do
so. " "' Indeed, even after Pope admitted that Sibley's men did not
have any food, he reported
to Washington that he would "push him
13
forward at all hazards.""
Unable to advance, and unable to return, Sibley turned his
attention to the Sioux men, women, and children, who had14 refused to
follow Little Crow and now remained in the nearby camp."
4.

A Usual But Impracticable Means: Summary
Executions

In the past, military commanders, and territorial governors
seeking to avenge civilian deaths relied on summary executions." 5

Sibley (Sept. 23, 1862), in Sibley Papers, supra note 30 (stating that the Sioux
received "so severe a blow that they will not dare to make another stand").
110.
Letter from Henry H. Sibley to John H. Pope (Sept. 27, 1862), supra
note 6, at 680 (asking to be relieved of command because a "strictly military
commander would be better fitted for the task than myself' and because "my
private affairs are left in utter confusion and require my presence."); see also
Letter from Henry H. Sibley, Colonel, Commanding Military Expedition, Minn.
State Militia, to Charles E. Flandrau, Colonel, Commanding Military Expedition,
Minn. State Militia (Sept. 28, 1862), in 2 Minnesota in the Civil and Indian Wars,
supra note 74, at 258, 258 (explaining that he wanted to return home as "[mly
business is going to destruction and I have stood so much wear and tear that I
need some rest").
111.
Letter from John H. Pope to Henry W. Halleck (Oct. 2, 1862), supra
note 108, at 706.
112.
Letter from John H. Pope to Henry H. Sibley (Sept. 28, 1862), supra
note 104, at 685; see also Letter from John H. Pope to Henry W. Halleck (Oct. 4,
1862), supra note 104, at 709 (urging the need for a strong force to be kept during
the winter).
113.
Letter from John H. Pope to Henry W. Halleck (Oct. 2, 1862), supra
note 108, at 706.
114.
Letter from Henry H. Sibley to John H. Pope (Sept. 27, 1862), supra
note 6, at 679.
115.
The use of summary executions as a deterrence mechanism was not
limited to Indian warfare. In 1862, General John McNeil executed, without trial,
ten Confederate prisoners, believed to be guerrillas, in retaliation for the killing
of an old man. See Horrible Federal Outrage-Ten Confederates Murdered-The
Full Particularsof the Scene, Palmyra (Mo.) Courier, undated, reprinted in 22
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Five years prior to the Minnesota attacks, for example,
Oregon's Territorial Governor, George Abernathy, learned that a
group of Cayuse had attacked a missionary settlement and allegedly
killed fourteen settlers.1 6 The legislature wanted to respond with
17
military force, but lacked the finances to support a general war.1
Faced with the need to take some form of action, the Governor
instructed officials in February of 1848 to persuade the Cayuse
leadership to hand over the perpetrators (or simply to hand over an
equivalent number of those
who participated in the attacks) so that
8
they could be executed. 1
In 1858, following a separate series of reported killings, an
officer in Oregon summarily executed two Pelouze chiefs in hopes of
deterring attacks. 9 The officer explained that such methods were
War Of The Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and
Confederate Armies, Ser. 1, Pt. 1, at 816, 817 (1888) [hereinafter 22 OR, Ser. 1,
Pt. 1]; see also William R. Strachan, Letter to the Editor, N.Y. Times, Dec. 10,
1862, reprinted in 22 OR, Ser. 1, Pt. 1, supra, at 861, 866 (1888) (justifying the
summary executions on the grounds that it would "teach traitors that the life of
an unarmed non-combatant Union man.., was a sacred thing that murderers
should not take with impunity").
116.
See Frances Fuller Victor, The Early Indian Wars of Oregon 99-102
(1894) (describing the attack).
117.
See Glassley, supra note 54, at 13 (describing how Oregon was "willing
to organize a punitive expedition but wholly without funds to finance it"); see also
Robert Newell, Memorial of the Legislative Assembly of Oregon, reprinted in S.
Exec. Doc. No. 47, at 46 (1848) ("We feel sensibly our weakness and inability to
enter into a war with powerful tribes of Indians."). Indeed, at the time, the
Territory had less than $44.00 in the treasury. Clarence B. Bagley, Our First
Indian War, 1 Pacific N.W. Q. 34, 43 (1907).
118.
Letter from George Abernethy, Governor of Or. Territory, to "the
Peace Commissioners Appointed to Treat with the Nez Perces and other Tribes"
(Feb. 3, 1848), in Robert Newell, Robert Newell's Memoranda 127, 128 (Dorothy
0. Johansen ed., 1959) (instructing the peace commissioners that "all the
murderers and those that forced the young women, must be delivered up, or an
equivalent given..." and stating that "the principal actors should be executed in
the presence of all the tribes") (emphasis added). Ultimately, Abernethy's
planned summary executions never took place. Instead, in 1850, after a newly
appointed Governor, Joseph Lane, negotiated with Cayuse leadership for the
surrender of Cayuse tribal members in exchange for peace, the five men who
surrendered were prosecuted in territorial court. See John A. Brown & Robert H.
Ruby, The Cayuse Indians: Imperial Tribesman of Old Oregon 153-60 (1972).
The five defendants were later executed, after a jury returned guilty verdicts. Id.
at 162-71 (describing the proceedings and executions).
119.
Lawrence Kip, Indian War in the Pacific Northwest 106 (Clifford E.
Trafzer ed., 1999); see also Letter from N.S. Clarke, Brigadier Gen., Commanding
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necessary given the nature of Indian warfare: "The Indians belong to
small bands. It is impossible ... to bring them to a fight, but they
will have to be hunted down like bandits." 2 °
Indeed, on the afternoon that Sibley and his small party
advanced towards the friendly camp, several soldiers reportedly
"insisted that Colonel Sibley would be justifiable in making any
treaty he could to obtain the captives, and when that was done, kill
all the Indians, men, women, and children."'2 One soldier who
weighed in on the discussion apparently quoted the "great Indian
fighter Harney"-the same Harney who had earlier killed eighty-five
Sioux in one day' 2 2 -to persuade Sibley that a mass execution was

appropriate as "nits make lice."2
Despite this enthusiasm for the reprisals of the past, on the
day Sibley arrived in the camp and convened a military commission,
this option was not available for a number of reasons.
First, although Sibley did not explicitly say so, the same
reasons that rendered an offensive pursuit impossible-lack of food
and cavalry' 24 -would have strongly cautioned against rounding up
and killing a handful of Sioux, or simply shooting the Sioux as he

Dep't of Cal., Gen. Staff, U.S. Army, to L. Thomas, Assistant Adjutant Gen., U.S.
Army (Oct. 10, 1858), in S. Exec. Doc. No. 35-1, pt. 2, at 406, 406 ("[T]he Pelouses
submitted to the demands of Colonel White, and gave hostages for their good
behavior. Some of these people, known to have been murderers and robbers, were
then executed."). This execution was not an outlier in the Indian wars of the
Pacific Northwest. See, e.g., General George Crook: His Autobiography 59-64
(Martin F. Schmitt ed., 1946) (describing how during the Rogue River War of
1855-1856, Crook's command, charged with both punishing Indian forces who had
defeated the U.S. Army in May of 1858 and killing a band of Indians who had
murdered prospectors, captured and executed four Indians).
120.
Kip, supra note 119, at 102.
121.
Heard, supra note 52, at 187.
122.
See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
123.
Heard, supra note 52, at 187. The term "nits" refers to a type of louse
egg.
124.
See Letter from Henry H. Sibley to John H. Pope (Sept. 27, 1862),
supra note 6, at 679 (explaining that without food, the expedition would be forced
to return); Letter from Henry H. Sibley, Brigadier Gen., Commanding Dist. of
Minn., Gen. Staff, U.S. Volunteers, to John H. Pope, Major Gen., Gen. Staff, U.S.
Volunteers & Brigadier Gen., Commanding Dep't of the Nw., Gen. Staff, U.S.
Army (Sept. 30, 1862), in 2 Minnesota in the Civil and Indian Wars, supra note
74, at 259, 259 (explaining that unless 500 mounted men arrived with additional
provisions and forage, the campaign "may be considered closed").
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125
approached (as one Senator later claimed Sibley should have done).
Such a move would have been likely to convert the friendly camp into
a hostile camp, particularly given Sibley's previous assurances.
Likewise, a seemingly random spate of executions could prompt a
retaliation from the Mdewakanton forces who remained on the
plains, and indeed, could have led to an alliance between the tribes.

Equally problematic, a spate of summary executions would
have deterred other Mdewakantons from surrendering. 126 Sibley, who
repeatedly emphasized that he could not carry out a continuing
expedition without additional cavalry and rations, hoped that
continued dissension among the Mdewakantons and the onset of
winter would drive others to surrender. Postponing an execution,
Sibley explained, would make it 2 more likely that he could secure
prisoners without the use of force.1 1
Sibley may also have had personal reasons to avoid
immediate executions. Sibley was unsure if he had authority to
execute the Sioux in any capacity, let alone without some form of
process.128 And as others have pointed out, Sibley had enjoyed a long125.
Cong. Globe, 37th Cong., 3d Sess. 13 (1862) (statement of Sen.
Wilkinson) ("Governor Sibley... ought to have killed every one of the Indians as
he came to them; but he did not; he established a court, and they were tried.").
126.
See Letter from Henry H. Sibley to John H. Pope (Oct. 3, 1862), supra
note 32, at 708 ("It is probable that I shall not order any execution of the guilty
until I can get those understood to be coming down to surrender themselves in
my power, as otherwise they might be deterred from returning."); Letter from
Henry H. Sibley, Brigadier Gen., Commanding Dist. of Minn., Gen. Staff, U.S.
Volunteers, to John H. Pope, Major Gen., Gen. Staff, U.S. Volunteers & Brigadier
Gen., Commanding Dep't of the Nw., Gen. Staff, U.S. Army (Oct. 7, 1862), in 13
OR, supra note 4, at 717 ("It would not do to precipitate matters now, for fear of
alarming those who are coming forward to take their chances."); Letter from
Henry H. Sibley, Brigadier Gen., Commanding Dist. of Minn., Gen. Staff, U.S.
Volunteers, to Sarah Sibley (Oct. 5, 1862), in Sibley Papers, supra note 30
(explaining his plan to postpone execution until everyone had surrendered); see
also The Indian Expedition, St. Paul Daily Press, Oct. 8, 1862, at 1 (reporting
that "[1]arge bodies of Indians are laying down their arms and seeking the
protection of Colonel Sibley"); Gilmon, supra note 21, at 185 (explaining that
Sibley did not immediately execute the Sioux who the commission had found
guilty because of his concern that it would deter other surrenders and his doubt
of his authority to do so).
127.
Letter from Henry H. Sibley to John H. Pope (Oct. 3, 1862), supra note
32, at 708.
128,
Letter from Henry H. Sibley to Charles E. Flandrau (Sept. 28, 1862),
supra note 110, at 688 (explaining that executing the Sioux might constitute a
"stretch" of Sibley's authority).
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held friendship with the Sioux. 129 Although this friendship does not
appear to have prevented Sibley from planning a war of
extermination, it seems likely that this could have made it difficult to
order random executions. It was in this context, wherein continued
pursuit and summary executions were deemed impractical, that
Sibley appointed five officers to 0pick a convenient place in camp and
begin the military commission.13
B.

The Role of the Military Commission

Throughout October and into November, as the prairie
grasses dried and the command's few horses grew lean, the military
commission that Sibley appointed tried 392 Sioux defendants. 3 ' The
majority of those who came before the commissioners arrived at
Sibley's encampment in early October, after Sibley-who remained
that
unable to advance' 3 -dispatched messengers to warn the Sioux
33
anyone who did not surrender would be treated as an enemy.
See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
129.
130.
Special Order No. 55 (Sept. 28, 1862), reprinted in Nathaniel West,
The Ancestry, Life, and Times of Hon. Henry Hastings Sibley 279 (1889).
Chomsky, supra note 8, at 27.
131.
132.
Sibley continued to express his inability to pursue the tribes
throughout October. On October 17, for example, Sibley informed Pope that if he
had an additional "few hundred mounted men," he would be "able to whip" the
remaining 2,200 Sioux warriors but cautioned that "they are well provided for the
most part with good horses" and could "easily elude the pursuit of footmen."
Letter from Henry H. Sibley, Brigadier Gen., Commanding Dist. of Minn., Gen.
Staff, U.S. Volunteers, to John H. Pope, Major Gen., Gen. Staff, U.S. Volunteers
& Brigadier Gen., Commanding Dep't of the Nw., Gen. Staff, U.S. Army (Oct. 17,
1862), in 13 OR, supra note 4, at 744, 746. Sibley also warned that "unless
provided with abundant forage, the horses will fail in less than ten days." Id.
On October 3, Sibley sent a message to the Mdewakantons and
133.
Wahpetons, encouraging anyone who had separated from Little Crow to "return
and surrender themselves." Unaddressed Letter from Henry H. Sibley, Brigadier
Gen., Commanding Dist. of Minn., Gen. Staff, U.S. Volunteers (Oct. 3, 1862), in
13 OR, supra note 4, at 709, 709 (warning "Unless these people arrive very soon, I
will go in search of them with my troops and treat them as enemies"). Over the
next week, several hundred Indians surrendered. See Letter from Henry H.
Sibley, Brigadier Gen., Commanding Dist. of Minn., Gen. Staff, U.S. Volunteers,
to John H. Pope, Major Gen., Gen. Staff, U.S. Volunteers & Brigadier Gen.,
Commanding Dep't of the Nw., Gen. Staff, U.S. Army (Oct. 4, 1862), in 13 OR,
supra note 4, at 710, 710 (reporting that 120 lodges are coming down slowly and
that it might be "necessary yet to attack them unless they surrender at
discretion"); Letter from Henry H. Sibley to John H. Pope (Oct. 5, 1862), supra
note 33, at 711 (reporting that more than 86 lodges were surrendering, of whom
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Although the threat was an empty one, the desolate plains
proved an inhospitable terrain. 134 By mid-October, over one hundred
lodges had returned and surrendered, increasing the population at
Sibley's camp to almost two thousand men, women, and children. 35
When Sibley finally received rations and mounted cavalry, the small
commands that he sent out to secure any "straggling" lodges
encountered36no resistance and returned with the last of the prisoners
to be tried.
Although the procedural flaws of this commission are
thoroughly catalogued in depth elsewhere, 37 this section will analyze
the correspondence and orders of those who participated in the
commission in order to identify how the military context at the time,
as outlined in Part A, informed the goals of the commission. These
records suggest that the officers who convened, participated in, and
approved the commission viewed its primary role as that of securing
U.S. interests at a time when military force was unavailable.

"the greater part of the men are deeply implicated in the late outrages"). After
the lodges arrived, Sibley surrounded the camp, disarmed the men, and took the
men to be tried by a military commission. Id. at 712.
134.
Anderson, supra note 2, at 162-65 (describing how Little Crow's
retreat into the "forbidding northern plains came at the most difficult time of the
year" for the eastern Sioux, who normally "sought shelter in more wooded
terrain," and noting that many Mdewakantons "believed that they would
eventually starve on the Dakota plains" and surrendered on the assumption that
Sibley would treat them as prisoners of war).
135.
See Samuel J. Brown's Recollections, in Dakota Eyes, supra note 1, at
222, 225 (estimating the population of Indians at Sibley's camp to be 1,918).
136.
Letter from Henry H. Sibley, Brigadier Gen., Commanding Dist. of
Minn., Gen. Staff, U.S. Volunteers, to William R. Marshall, Lieutenant Colonel,
Commanding Seventh Regiment, Minn. Volunteers (Oct. 13, 1862), in 13 OR,
supra note 4, at 735, 735 (instructing Marshall to lead a command to capture any
"straggling" Indians or their families); Letter from Henry H. Sibley to John H.
Pope (Oct. 17, 1862), supra note 132, at 745 (reporting that a command had
successfully captured twenty-two men, twenty-two women, and twenty-three
children "without even a show of resistance"); Letter from Henry H. Sibley,
Brigadier Gen., Commanding Dist. of Minn., Gen. Staff, U.S. Volunteers, to John
H. Pope, Major Gen., Gen. Staff, U.S. Volunteers & Brigadier Gen., Commanding
Dep't of the Nw., Gen. Staff, U.S. Army (Oct. 21, 1862), in 13 OR, supra note 4, at
756, 757 (reporting that Marshall's command had returned with "all the Indians
to be found" in the county he visited).
137.
See Chomsky, supra note 8, at 14-15; see generally supra note 17
(citing literature providing a normative assessment of the commission's
procedures).
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The View from Sibley's Headquarters in September
1862

On September 28, 1862, the officers who served on the
military commission received a slim set of instructions from Sibley:
they were to try "summarily" the Indians and "mixed-bloods" and
pass judgment on those found guilty of "murder and other
outrages." 38 "The degree of39guilt," Sibley later wrote, "was not one of
the objects to be attained."'
These instructions, coupled with Sibley's handling of the
proceedings and the correspondence of those involved in the
commission, reveal that the military did not, as some scholars have
implied, convene the commission to provide a forum where
defendants would be afforded the procedural safeguards of a criminal
tribunal or court-martial used to try one's own troops. 4 ° Instead,
these records suggest that the project was to facilitate the hanging of
a sufficient number of Indians, in an execution that would
demonstrate American military strength and placate demands for
retribution at a time when the military could not achieve these
objectives on the battlefield. As Sibley later explained, the project
was not to emulate a court of record: "A military commission cannot,
and is not expected to enter into details of a technical character,
which are judged necessary
in ordinary criminal tribunals, and even
14
in regular courts-martial."' '
Sibley's understanding of the military commission's role is
evident in his handling of the procedures. On the day Sibley

138.
Special Order No. 55 (Sept. 28, 1862), supra note 130.
139.
Letter from Henry H. Sibley, Brigadier Gen., Commanding Dist. of
Minn., Gen. Staff, U.S. Volunteers, to John P. Usher, U.S. Assistant Sec'y of the
Interior (Dec. 19, 1862), in Records of U.S. Army Continental Commands
(National Archives Record Group [NARG] 393), Letters and Telegrams Sent,
Entry 343, typed copy available in Records of the Adjutant General's Office
(NARG 94), microformed on Letters Received by the Office of the Adjutant
General 1861-1870, M 619, Roll 483 (1866, H 747-45) (Nat'l Archives and Records
Admin.) [hereinafter Letters Received by the Office of the Adjutant Gen.].
140.
See supra text accompanying notes 22-25 (summarizing prevailing
theory that the military commission emerged as a substitute for otherwise
unavailable court-martial or criminal tribunal).
141.
Letter from Henry H. Sibley, Brigadier Gen., Commanding Dist. of
Minn., Gen. Staff, U.S. Volunteers, to Henry B. Whipple, Bishop of Minn. (Dec. 4,
1862) in Henry B. Whipple Papers, Minnesota Historical Society, St. Paul,
Minnesota [hereinafter Whipple Papers].
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convened the commission, he neither offered formal instructions as to
how the commissioners ought to adjudicate guilt, save for a broad
reference to "military laws and usages," nor defined the offenses
charged against the defendants, referring only to the capacious
category of "murder and other outrages." 142 The commissioners, he
later explained, had no obligation to determine whether a defendant
had personally killed settlers, provided that the commissioners were
satisfied4 3that the defendant had voluntarily participated in the
attacks.
Likewise, once the commission was underway, Sibley did not
review the record of the proceedings during the first two weeks" and
was not particularly troubled by aberrations in the procedures:
Although "the proceedings ... may not be exactly in form in all the
details," he wrote to Pope, "I shall probably approve them, and hang
the villains as soon as I get hold of the others." 45
Despite this lack of concern for procedure, Sibley was explicit
as to the appropriate sentence. Anyone found guilty, he told Pope on
the day he convened the commission, will "be immediately executed"
because "an example is . . . imperatively necessary." 146 Although
Sibley did not explain why "examples" were needed, his later
writings suggest that he considered an execution necessary both to
placate public demands for extermination and to deter future
attacks.
For example, even before the commission had ended, Sibley
predicted that the number of defendants to be executed "will be
142.
Special Orders No. 55 (Sept. 28, 1862), supra note 130.
143.
Letter from Henry H. Sibley to John P. Usher (Dec. 19, 1862), supra
note 139 (asserting that "[in the matter of the Indian prisoners and the alleged
paucity of evidence against them on the record, it should be borne in mind that
the Military Commission appointed by me were instructed only to satisfy
themselves of the voluntary participation of the individual on trial in the murders
or massacres committed, either by his voluntary confession or by other evidence
and then to proceed no further").
144.
Letter from Henry H. Sibley to John H. Pope (Oct. 7, 1862), supra note
126, at 717. Sibley previously had written to Pope to explain that he had not yet
reviewed the proceedings. Letter from Henry H. Sibley to John H. Pope (Oct. 4,
1862), supra note 133, at 710.
145.
Id.
146.
Letter from Henry H. Sibley, Colonel, Commanding Military
Expedition, Minn. State Militia, to John H. Pope, Major Gen., Gen. Staff, U.S.
Volunteers & Brigadier Gen., Commanding Dep't of the Nw., Gen. Staff, U.S.
Army (Sept. 28, 1862), in 13 OR, supra note 4, at 686, 687.
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"
sufficiently great to satisfy the longings of the most blood thirsty. 147
In making this prediction, Sibley may have been responding to news
reports that had surfaced as early as August calling for "the most
summary measures of retaliation by the Government." 148 Indeed, as
the Saint Paul Press proclaimed in mid-November, "[t]he people of
Minnesota ... are not in temper for a delicate balancing of evidence,
or a judicial discrimination of the degrees of guilt.' 49 Instead, as The
Saint Paul Daily Press urged in late October, a mass execution was
deemed necessary: the war "ought" not to end "[u]ntil Little Crow
and every one of his assassin horde are delivered up and hung as
high as Haman" so as to teach the Sioux, "by a comprehensive
example of prompt and terrible retribution, that the life of a single
citizen of the United States is worth more than their whole
nation. . .""1

In using the commission as a means to ensure exemplary
punishment, Sibley may also have been responding to concerns about
future attacks. For example, after the commission ended, Sibley
reasoned that all defendants who had been sentenced to death
"should . . . be hung as a great example which would strike terror
into all the Indians on the continent and save hundreds and perhaps
thousands of valuable lives."' 5'
Pope, meanwhile, who remained in St. Paul and continued to
plan for a campaign of extermination, 5 ' seems to have had no
qualms about using the commission as a means to stage a public
execution without individual adjudication. At no time did Pope
provide guidance to Sibley as to how the commission should assess

147.
Letter from Henry H. Sibley to Sarah Sibley (Oct. 20, 1862), in Sibley
Papers, supra note 30; see also The Sioux War, Mankato Semi-Wldy. Rec., Oct.
18, 1862, at 1 (quoting Sibley as saying "that when he was done with the Indians,
there would not be enough Sioux left to hurt any more white people").
148.
See supra note 5.
149.
The Sioux Prisoners:An Emphatic ProtestAgainst Pardoning Them,
St. Paul Press, Nov. 11, 1862, excerpted in Chi. Trib., Nov. 14, 1862, at 2.
150.
Is the Sioux War Ended, St. Paul Daily Press, Oct. 22, 1862, at 1.
151.
Letter from Henry H. Sibley to John P. Usher (Dec. 19, 1862), supra
note 139.
152.
See, e.g., Letter from John H. Pope to Henry H. Sibley (Sept. 28,
1862), supra note 104, at 686 ("There will be no peace in this region by virtue of
treaties and Indian faith. It is my purpose utterly to exterminate the Sioux if I
have the power to do so ....

");

Letter from John H. Pope to Henry W. Halleck

(Oct. 4, 1862), supra note 104, at 709 (urging the need for a strong force to be

kept during the winter).
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guilt, and Pope even expressed skepticism that such a determination
could be made: "I don't know how you can discriminate between
Indians who say they are and have been friendly, and those who have
not."153 Editorialists agreed that such determinations were
impossible. As the Mankato Weekly Record pointed out after the
commission had ended, "[tihe massacre was premeditated and
simultaneous by the whole Sioux tribe; and it must indeed be a nice
discrimination that can distinguish the 'ringleaders' from the
followers. All are alike murderers, and no 54punishment short of
hanging will satisfy the citizens of Minnesota."'
Perhaps not surprisingly, instead of advising the commission
as to how to make such individual determinations of guilt, Pope
repeatedly emphasized the need not just for an execution, but for a
public execution, one that would frighten the Sioux into submission
and satisfy demands for retribution.'55
Those involved in the proceedings appear to have understood
their role was not to carry out the type of individual adjudication
afforded to defendants in civilian courts or to American soldiers in
courts-martial. Isaac D.V. Heard, for example, a Minnesotan who
served as the recorder of the court, later sought to justify the

153.
Letter from John H. Pope, Major Gen., Gen. Staff, U.S. Volunteers &
Brigadier Gen., Commanding Dep't of the Nw., Gen. Staff, U.S. Army, to Henry
H. Sibley, Brigadier Gen., Commanding Dist. of Minn., Gen. Staff, U.S.
Volunteers (Oct. 2, 1862), microformed on Letters Received by the Office of the
Adjutant Gen., supra note 139.
154.
The Sioux War: the Ringleaders to Be Hung, Mankato Semi-Wkly.
Rec., Nov. 15, 1862, at 1; see also Is the Sioux War Ended, supra note 150, at 1
("It will not do to tell us these Indians are friendly, and those are well disposed,
and others, are penitent.").
155.
See, e.g., Letter from John H. Pope, Major Gen., Gen. Staff, U.S.
Volunteers & Brigadier Gen., Commanding Dep't of the Nw., Gen. Staff, U.S.
Army, to Henry H. Sibley, Brigadier Gen., Commanding Dist. of Minn., Gen.
Staff, U.S. Volunteers (Oct. 10, 1862), microformed on Letters Received by the
Office of the Adjutant Gen., supra note 139 (giving no instructions for
adjudication but detailed instructions for execution); see also Letter from John H.
Pope, Major Gen., Gen. Staff, U.S. Volunteers & Brigadier Gen., Commanding
Dep't of the Nw., Gen. Staff, U.S. Army, to Henry H. Sibley, Brigadier Gen.,
Commanding Dist. of Minn., Gen. Staff, U.S. Volunteers (Oct. 17, 1862),
microformed on Letters Received by the Office of the Adjutant Gen., supra note
139 (again providing no instructions for adjudication procedures but reemphasizing the need for a public execution).
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56
commission on dual grounds: first, that the procedures were sound,
and second, on a principle of collective guilt. 157 This latter principle
was based on the idea that the Sioux's wartime conduct was
sufficiently beyond the scope of "ordinary battles" and "rendered the
acts of one the acts of all."' 58 As he implied in an editorial published
shortly after the commission had ended, individual guilt was
secondary to the goal of retaliation: "The law of retaliatory war is the
common law, and the law of the savage, which takes life for life,
whether it be that of the offender or his relatives, and which would
require a thousand more victims, [and] demand that these prisoners
should die."'59

Reverend Stephen R. Riggs, who was appointed as an
interpreter for the commission, 60 later described a similarly
circumvented role for the commission: "A military commission, where
the cases of forty men are passed upon in six, or seven hours, is not
the place for the.. clear bringing out of evidence and securing a fair
trial to every one."'
Unlike Heard, Riggs expressed disgust for such summary
proceedings. In an editorial published after the commission had
ended, Riggs explained that he had "no particular liking to the
[commission's] manner of convicting Indians" and that that he had
"learned to work from a sense of duty and not pleasure." 162 But while
Riggs remarked that he would not be surprised if the meagerness
and defectiveness of the testimony led to new trials, and later called

156.
Letter to the Editor, The Indian Trials: The Military Commission and
its Mode of Procedure: The Nature of the Evidence Against the Condemned, St.
Paul Pioneer, Dec. 11, 1862 (defending the commission on the grounds that the
commissioners were unbiased, "respectable and humane citizens," and that the
defendants were tried on written charges and convicted on the grounds of positive
testimony). As Chomsky points out, the author of this letter is presumably Isaac
Heard; the author, "H," identified himself as one who was present at the
proceedings and gave similar details to that which Heard later provided.
Chomsky, supra note 8, at 56 n.268.
157.
Letter to the Editor, supra note 156.
158.
Heard, supra note 52, at 255-56 (describing how Sioux attacks on
civilian settlements violated the law of war and justified American retaliation).
159.
Letter to the Editor, supra note 156 (emphasis added).
160.
See Letter from Stephen R. Riggs, Reverend, to Martha Riggs (Sept.
27, 1862), in Riggs Papers, supra note 48.
161.
Stephen R. Riggs, Letter to the Editor, The Dakota Rebellion, St. Paul
Daily Press, Nov. 29, 1862, at 1.
162.
Id.

776

COLUMBIA HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW

[40:743

for such trials in some instances, 163 he nevertheless grudgingly
accepted the commission's role as a means of facilitating a mass
execution, concluding that:
But all this aside, I take the grounds that simple, stern, and
merciful justice has demands to be satisfied that cannot be
ignored. I take it that a terrible necessity-the demand of
public justice-requires that the great majority of those
who are condemned should be executed. This is necessary
as an atonement. It is necessary to satisfy the feeling of
justice in the community generally, and it is necessary as a
lesson to the red men for all time to come. And lastly, it is
necessary for securing the protection and proper treatment
of the women and children and innocent men who
remain.164

This emphasis on ensuring a mass execution, evident in the
writings of Sibley, Pope, and the participants in the commission, can
be explained by the fact that Sibley convened the commission only
after the traditional means of military reprisals were found to be
unavailable. In Sibley's view, had he simply had more cavalry when
the Sioux attacked him in late September, 165 he could have lawfully
killed two-thirds of the hostile Indians without any process
whatsoever.166 As he explained shortly after the commission began
hearing cases:
I would be glad to pursue, and wipe out Little Crow, and
the wretches who have escaped with him, which cannot be
done without a mounted force . .

.

. If I had had a few

hundred of this description of force after we walloped the

163.

Stephen R. Riggs, Letter to the Editor, The Indian Question, St. Paul

Pioneer, Dec. 14, 1862.
164.
Stephen R. Riggs, Letter to the Editor, supra note 161, at 1; see also
Stephen R. Riggs, Letter to the Editor, What is Duty-What is Right, St. Paul
Daily Press, Jan. 15, 1863, at 2 ("[TIhe same principle of justice that requires of
us the painful duty of punishing the guilty, requires of us equally that we should
punish only in accordance with desert, as far as possible, and that we should be
solicitous to be clear and protect the innocent.") (emphasis in original).
165.
Letter from Henry H. Sibley, Colonel, Commanding Military
Expedition, Minn. State Militia, to Alexander Ramsey, Governor of Minn. (Sept.
23, 1862), in 2 Minnesota in the Civil and Indian Wars, supra note 74, at 242
(estimating that if Sibley had been equipped with more cavalry, he could have
killed the "greater portion" of the Indians).
166.
Letter from Henry H. Sibley to Charles E. Flandrau (Sept. 28, 1862),
supra note 110, at 258 (estimating that if Sibley had had more cavalry, he could
have "destroyed two-thirds of the hostile Indians").
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savages, the
67 greater part of them would have been
destroyed. 1
By deploying a military commission, Sibley estimated that he could
kill roughly the same number of Sioux. 168 And, indeed, by November
5, 1862, a little over a month after he determined that continued
pursuit was impossible, the commission accomplished a feat that
would have been impossible
on the battlefield: it had sentenced 303
169
prisoners to death.
Despite the emphasis on facilitating this mass execution of
over three hundred of the enemy force, the commission did engage in
some degree of individual adjudication. 70 This is perhaps best
illustrated in the acquittal rate. Rather than sentencing all those
who came before it to death, the commission acquitted sixty-nine
prisoners, roughly eighteen percent of those tried, whom the
commission determined had not voluntarily participated in the
outrages.'' Likewise, the commission also discriminated in
sentencing: those whom the commission determined to have only
engaged in plunder were sentenced to terms of imprisonment rather
than capital punishment.'7 2
These outcomes suggest that although the military's stated
goal was not to determine the degree of guilt, the commission
nevertheless distinguished between defendants deemed more
culpable than others.
2.

The View from the White House in December 1862

Sibley and Pope were not the only ones to view the
commission primarily as a means of advancing U.S. strategic
objectives, rather than providing due process. By the time the list of
the condemned Sioux reached President Abraham Lincoln's desk for

167.
Letter from Henry H. Sibley, Brigadier Gen., Commanding Dist. of
Minn., Gen. Staff, U.S. Volunteers, to Sarah Sibley (Oct. 1, 1862), in Sibley
Papers, supra note 30.
168.
Letter from Henry H. Sibley to John H. Pope (Oct. 7, 1862), supra note
126, at 717 (estimating that he would be able to execute two-thirds of those
involved in the attacks).
169.
Chomsky, supra note 8, at 28.
170.
Sibley also appears to have harbored misgivings about the use of the
commission for summary justice. See infra text accompanying notes 253-267.
171.
Chomsky, supra note 8, at 28.

172.

Id.
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his review and approval, the commander-in-chief of the beleaguered
Union found himself, as Sibley had several months earlier, with
limited options.'7 3
Although Lincoln's involvement in the Sioux military
commission has been extensively analyzed elsewhere, 174 it is
worthwhile to briefly observe here that his handling of the review
process suggests that he, like the commanders in the field, did not
view the commission as an adjudicatory forum intended to replicate a
court-martial or a criminal tribunal.
Lincoln's involvement in the commission began in midOctober 1862, when he informed Pope that no executions could
proceed without his authorization. 175 Accordingly, on November 8,
Pope sent Lincoln a list of the defendants whom the commission had
sentenced to death. 176 Two days later, Lincoln instructed Pope to
forward 77the "full and complete record of these convictions" for his
review.
At the time of this review, Lincoln faced considerable political
and military challenges. Administrative advisors and concerned
constituencies warned that allowing the executions to go forward
would mar the legitimacy of the Union and potentially jeopardize
Union prisoners of war. 78 As Colonel Charles Flandrau later
remarked:

173.
See S. Exec. Doc. No. 37-7, at 1 (1862) (describing the difficulty of
responding to the list of condemned Sioux in a way that would prevent further
outbreaks, but stopped short of cruelty).
174.
For a detailed account of Lincoln's involvement in the military
commission, see David A. Nichols, Lincoln and the Indians 94-118 (1978); see
also David Herbert Donald, Lincoln 393-95 (1995) (chronicling Lincoln's
reactions to the Sioux uprising).
175.
Letter from John H. Pope to Henry H. Sibley (Oct. 17, 1862), supra
note 155 (ITIhe President directs that no executions be made without his
sanction.").
176.
Id.
177.
Letter from Abraham Lincoln, President of the U.S., to John H. Pope,
Major Gen., Gen. Staff, U.S. Volunteers & Brigadier Gen., Commanding Dep't of
the Nw., Gen. Staff, U.S. Army (Nov. 10, 1862), in 6 The Collected Works of
Abraham Lincoln 493 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1890).
178.
For example, in early December, Gideon Welles, Lincoln's Secretary of
the Navy, suggested that if the United States were to execute three hundred
surrendered prisoners, it would render the United States no different from the
"barbarians" to be executed. See 1 Diary of Gideon Welles 186 (Howard K. Beale
ed., 1960) (noting that the sentiments of the Minnesotan congressmen who urged
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[Tihe eyes of the world were upon us. Had these hundred
men been executed, the charge would undoubtedly have
been made by the South that the North was murdering
prisoners of war, and the authorities at Washington knew
full well that the other nations of the earth were not
capable of making the proper discrimination, and deemed it
safer not to incure
the odium which might follow from such
179
an accusation.

In early November, the Commissioner of Indian Affairs warned that
although retaliatory and vindictive measures were warranted, the
execution of three hundred Indians would be 80"a stain upon our
national character and a source of future regret."

Lincoln to approve the executions "were but slightly removed from the barbarians
whom they would execute").
179.
Flandrau, supra note 71, at 748. In mid-November, Minnesota's state
Bishop, Henry B. Whipple, raised additional concerns in a letter to Minnesota
Senator Henry B. Rice, in which he urged a reform of federal Indian policy and
noted that the planned execution could trigger a prolonged war and God's anger:
[W]e cannot hang men by hundreds. Upon our own premises
we have no right to do so. We claim that they are an
independent nation & as such they are prisoners of war. The
leaders must be punished but we cannot afford by any wanton
cruelty to purchase a long Indian war-nor by injustice in

other matters purchase the anger of God.
Letter from Henry B. Whipple, Bishop of Minn., to Henry M. Rice, Minn, Senator
(Nov. 12, 1862), in Whipple Papers, supra note 141. Rice, in reply, rejected the
suggestion that the Sioux were prisoners of war and insisted that those found
guilty should be executed, as the Sioux had violated the laws of war by engaging

in a number of offenses, including killing unoffending men, women, and children;
nailing infants to trees; and "gratifi[yingl" their "beastly passions" with young
girls: "[I1n my opinion they are murderers of the deepest degree. The laws of war
cannot be so far distorted as to reach this case in any respect . .

. ."

Letter from

Henry M. Rice, Minn. Senator, to Henry B. Whipple, Bishop of Minn. (Nov. 19,
1862), in Whipple Papers, supra note 141. Whipple later clarified that he had not
meant to imply that he personally believed the Sioux to be an independent nation
with the right to engage in war. Letter from Henry B. Whipple, Bishop of Minn.,
to Henry M. Rice, Minn. Sen. (Nov. 29, 1862), in Whipple Papers, supra note 141.
180.
As the Commissioner explained:
[Ilt seems to me that an indiscriminate punishment of men
who have laid down their arms and surrendered themselves as
prisoners partakes more of the character of revenge than the

infliction of deserved punishment, that it is contrary to the
spirit of the age and our character as a great, magnanimous
and Christian people; nor would it, in my opinion, be attended
with beneficial results.
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Allowing the executions to go forward could also undermine
support for the Union in the north. 181 In the months leading up to the
execution, religious and reform groups in New York and Philadelphia
criticized the United States' treatment of Native Americans in
general and petitioned for a complete overhaul of federal Indian
policy.'82 These advocates argued that an execution would be
fundamentally unjust, given that it was America's breach of its own
treaty obligations that gave rise to the attacks of August 1862.183

Letter from William P. Dole, U.S. Commissioner of Indian Affairs, to Caleb B.
Smith, U.S. Sec'y of the Interior (Nov. 9, 1862), in Mankato Wkly. Rec., Dec. 13,
1862, at 1. The New York Times echoed this concern the following month, noting
that "the simultaneous execution of 300 persons, no matter what may have been
their crimes . . .cannot fail to effect largely and seriously the character of the
nation in the eyes of the world and on the pages of permanent history." The
Hangingof 300 Indians, N.Y. Times, Dec. 8, 1862, at 4.
181.
See, e.g., Charles S. Bryant, A History of the Great Massacre by the
Sioux Indians in Minnesota 39 (1864) (describing criticism of the sentence in
Eastern papers, which "in numerous instances, gave countenance to the Indian
sympathizers"); Heard, supra note 52, at 270 (stating that "[slome have criticized
the action of the court because of the great number of the condemned"); Alonzo P.
Connolly, A Thrilling Narrative of the Minnesota Massacre and the Sioux War of
1862-63, at 164 (1896) (describing how "protests were sent in to the President
from all sorts of humanitarians, imploring him to stay the sentence that
condemned to death so many human beings").
182.
For example, in December, a group of advocates planned a meeting in
New York to discuss how to correct the "want of common humanity" that had
characterized the government's treatment of the Sioux and triggered the
outbreak. Other 2-No Title, 17 Christian Inquirer 3 (1862). See also Letter to the
Editor, Philadelphia Press, reprinted in St. Paul Pioneer, Dec. 2, 1862, at 1
(describing gatherings in Philadelphia to prevent the executions); Letter from
Henry B. Whipple to Henry M. Rice (Nov. 12, 1862), supra note 179 (requesting
that the Senator present Whipple's letter to Lincoln and noting that "it is our
culpable mismanagement, robbery, & sin which has brought this harvest of
blood").
183.
See An Appeal for the Indians: A Letter to President Lincoln from
FatherBeeson, N.Y. Times, Nov. 29, 1862, at 1 (quoting a letter by Father John
Beeson to Lincoln, in which Beeson protested the imposition of capital
punishment on the grounds, among others, that the United States had violated
its treaty obligations to the Sioux); see also, Black, White, and Red, 40 The Albion
569, 569 (1862) (referring to "grave doubts" as to "whether justice really requires
the death by hanging of the three hundred Indians"). But see Letter from William
R. Marshall, Lieutenant Colonel, Commanding Seventh Regiment Minn.
Volunteers, to Henry B. Whipple, Bishop of Minn. (Dec. 19, 1862), in Whipple
Papers, supra note 141 (noting that had the United States treated the Indians
fairly, the August attacks could have been avoided, but observing that the fact of
this ill treatment did not "mitigate the decreed punishment of the guilty").
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Capitulating to these demands for a general pardon,
however, presented a number of risks. By late 1862, the war effort
was flailing in the South and "Confederate successes had filled the
nation with gloom.' ' 84 Minnesota representatives warned that if the
slated executions of the Sioux did not occur, Lincoln could expect a
second war on the western front. 5 Reports had surfaced that the
Confederacy was urging the Indians to "combine in a common cause
against the United States."'8 6 Absent an execution, settlers warned,
the Sioux would continue to launch attacks on civilians, such that
"there can be no safety for us or for our families." 87
In December, the New York Evening Post identified yet
another risk of inaction: vigilante justice. If Lincoln did not provide
"proper and exemplary punishment for the murderers," the Post
warned, the feverish people of Minnesota were "likely to take the law

184.
West, supra note 130, at 282.
185.
See Letter from Morton Smith Wilkinson, Minn. Sen., et al., to
Abraham Lincoln, President of the U.S. (undated), in S. Exec. Doc. No. 37-7,
supra note 173, at 4 ("If the [pardon] is done, the Indians will become more
insolent and cruel than they ever were before, believing, as they certainly will
believe, that their great father at Washington either justified their acts or is
afraid to punish them for their crimes.").
West, supra note 130, at 282 (quoting H.M. Rice's letter to
186.
Washington, dated September 21, 1862, that "the Western tribes are going to join
the South," and that "the Sioux raids are induced by rebels and traitors").
187.
Memorial to the President of the United States, in S. Exec. Doc. No.
37-7, supra note 173, at 4-5; see also Chomsky, supra note 8, at 61 ("Public outcry
in Minnesota resulted in enormous pressure on the President to punish the
Dakota for the war. No matter how the President might otherwise have reacted
to the record laid before him, he apparently felt compelled to compromise by
permitting a limited number of executions despite the unsatisfactory nature of
the proceedings."); Memorial to the President of the United States from the
Citizens of St. Paul, in St. Paul Pioneer, Nov. 27, 1862 (asking that the Sioux
"receive the punishment due those crimes" as a "matter of vengeance" and "much
more a matter of future security for our border settlers"); Resolutions Adopted at
a Meeting of the Citizens of Mankato and Vicinity, Blue Earth County (Dec. 3,
1862), in St. Paul Pioneer, Dec. 10, 1862, at 1 (justifying the speedy execution of
the Sioux "as a sure safe guard to the frontier settlers against the possible
recurrence of like outrages"); Resolutions Adopted at New Ulm (Nov. 23, 1862), in
St. Paul Daily Press, Nov. 29, 1862 (warning that "the exercise of clemency . ..
toward the Sioux Indians, for their late atrocities, will be considered by the
Indians an invitation coming from our Government to renew all the horrors of
their warfare upon the women, children, and defenseless frontier settlers").
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into their own hands.' 8 As one contributor to the Saint Paul Daily
Press threatened in mid-November:
If the Government wants wholesale hanging by the acre; if
they want the western plains turned into a wide Golgotha
of dead Indians; if they want them hunted down like wild
beasts from the face of the Continent, they had better
refuse to perform the act of justice which the people of this
State demand,89 and turn the unshrived criminals over to
their victims. 1

This prospect of "wholesale hanging by the acre"-even if
exaggerated' 9° -would have cautioned against granting a general
pardon.
Faced with these weighty considerations, Lincoln, like Sibley
before him, treated the commission not as a device designed to
ensure accurate individual adjudication, but rather, as a device that
could be deployed to protect the country's best interests. If Lincoln
had viewed the commission as a substitute for a courtroom, one in
which defendants would receive due process before a fair tribunal, he
presumably could have nullified the proceedings and ordered new
trials. 9' Instead, Lincoln accepted the existing records and, in doing
so, recognized the legality of the commission. 192
188.

The Mutinous Indians in Minnesota, N.Y. Evening Post, excerpted in

St. Paul Pioneer, Dec. 12, 1862.
189.
A Word of Advice to the Government of the United States, St. Paul
Daily Press, Nov. 9, 1862, at 1.
190.
See The Minnesotians Ferocious, St. Paul Pioneer, Dec. 7, 1862, at 1
(denying reports that Minnesota had called for vengeance upon "all Indians in the
State" and insisting that "we have not heard of a single instance" of "wreaking
private vengeance upon" the Indians "for months"); see also Versus the
Clergymen, St. Paul Daily Press, Dec. 6, 1862, at 1 (referring to a "mistaken"
belief held by prominent Minnesota clergymen that the "spirit of indiscriminate
extermination" prevails generally among the people of Minnesota); Winnebagos
Discharged, Mankato Semi-Wkly. Rec., Nov. 29, 1862, at 1 (asserting that
Minnesotans would not attack Indians acquitted at a military commission as
"ours is a law abiding community").
191.
Chomsky argues that the commission's sentences could have been
overturned under a broad reading of Article of War 65, a provision that expressly
applied only to courts-martial. This provision prohibited officers from acting as
both the accuser and prosecutor. Therefore, the provision could have been used to
invalidate the military commission. See Chomsky, supra note 8, at 56-59.
192.
See Letter to the Editor, The Query, St. Paul Pioneer, Dec. 10, 1862, at
1 ("[Flrom every indication it would seem that it was the intention of the
President to recognize the legality of the court that tried these Indians by the
approving of their sentence as to a few, and pardoning the greater number.").
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As he later explained to Congress, "[a]nxious to not act with
so much clemency as to encourage another outbreak, on the one
hand, nor with so much severity as to be real cruelty, on the other,"
Lincoln instructed his staff to examine the commission records and
identify all the defendants whom had been found guilty of rape: only
those convicted of this offense would be executed. 193 When the list of
prisoners to be executed came back as including only two defendants,
a number that was unlikely to satisfy Minnesotans calling for a mass
execution, Lincoln altered the eligibility for the death penalty: he
asked his staff to list all those defendants who were convicted of rape
and murder.1 94 This time, the number of defendants to be executed
was thirty-nine, and Lincoln approved the sentences. 95
Thus, after one defendant was pardoned, Sibley's first
expedition, launched with the goal of killing a thousand Sioux, came
to an end two weeks later on the main street of the1 town
of Mankato,
96
Minnesota, where thirty-eight Sioux were executed.
C.

A Similar Pattern in Subsequent Sioux Military
Commissions

Over the next three years, as Sibley led two further
campaigns against the hostile Sioux, he convened two additional
military commissions. Sibley deployed and structured these
commissions with a similar goal in mind: to supplement military
force as a means of defeating the hostile Sioux.
The circumstances surrounding the first of these
commissions, which Sibley convened on August 22, 1863,197 were
similar to those present when Sibley convened the 1862 military
commission. As before, Sibley faced a perceived threat to the
frontier's security: a coalition force of 2,200 to 2,500 Indians-a force
193.

S. Exec. Doc. No. 37-7, supra note

194.

Id. at 1-2.

195.
196.

Id. at 2.
For a description of the execution, see The Indian Executions, N.Y.

173, at 1.

Times, Jan. 11, 1863, at 3; see also Execution of 39 Sioux, Mankato Wkly. Rec.

(Supplement), Dec. 26, 1862, at 1 (describing the execution). For an account of the
fate of the prisoners who were not executed, see Chomsky, supra note 8, at 38-40.
197.
Special Order No. 300 (Aug. 22, 1863), copied in Proceedings of a
Military Commission which Convened at Fort Abercrombie, D.T., By Order of the
Following Special Order [hereinafter Commission Proceedings in the Trial of Wowe-na-pa], in Court Martial Cases (NARG 153), Case No. NN-3132 [hereinafter
Court Martial Cases].
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that Sibley estimated to be the largest concentration in the history of
the country-had encamped across the Missouri. 9 8 Although Sibley
had triumphantly prevailed against this united alliance in battle,
inflicting a "severe" punishment in early August, he predicted that,
absent "further chastisement," a significant force would be needed
"against these powerful bands should they attempt, in large
numbers, to molest the settlements in retaliation for the losses they
have sustained during the late engagements." 99
Also as before, the spate of killings triggered widespread
panic, prompted many settlers to flee, and renewed calls for
extermination of the Sioux. 00 For example, in early July, Colonel
Stephen Miller of the state volunteer regiments informed Sibley that
he had sent cavalry into the "big woods with directions to hunt down
the Sioux like wolves, and to remain until not one of the fiends shall
have an existence in the State."2 ' And once again, Sibley found
himself seeking additional supplies. Six days before convening the
commission, Sibley was obliged to temporarily abandon-for the

198.
Letter from Henry H. Sibley, Brigadier Gen., Commanding Dist. of
Minn., Gen. Staff, U.S. Volunteers, to J.F. Meline, Assistant Adjutant Gen., Dep't
of the Nw., U.S. Volunteers (Aug. 7, 1863), in 2 Minnesota in the Civil and Indian
Wars, supra note 74, at 297, 301.
199.
Letter from Henry H. Sibley, Brigadier Gen., Commanding Dist. of
Minn., Gen. Staff, U.S. Volunteers, to J.F. Meline, Assistant Adjutant Gen., Dep't
of the Nw., U.S. Volunteers (Aug. 16, 1863), in 2 Minnesota in the Civil and
Indian Wars, supra note 74, at 304-05; see also Letter from Stephen Miller,
Colonel, Minn. St. Militia, to Henry H. Sibley, Brigadier Gen., Commanding Dist.
of Minn., Gen. Staff, U.S. Volunteers (July 9, 1863), in Sibley Papers, supra note
30 (expressing hope that the conflict would end soon, but worrying that "they may
come down upon us in numbers").
200.
See Folwell, supra note 21, at 237-38 (describing the fear that
animated frontier life during the "raiding season" of 1863 and explaining how,
despite the vigilant patrols of Sibley's commands, "parties of savages broke
through at various points" and killed settlers); Letter from Stephen Miller to
Henry H. Sibley (July 9, 1863), supra note 199 ("Hundreds of citizens are flying
from the frontier as usual, and every town and settlement demands the
protections of a company."); Letter from Henry H. Sibley, Brigadier Gen.,
Commanding Dist. of Minn., Gen. Staff, U.S. Volunteers, to J.F. Meline, Assistant
Adjutant Gen., Dep't of the Nw., U.S. Volunteers (Aug. 23, 1863), in 22 OR, Ser.1,
Pt. 1, supra note 115, at 908, 909 (describing the need to reassure the settlers);
see also Clodfelter, supra note 19, at 72-73 (describing a panic equivalent to that
of 1862).
201.
Letter from Stephen Miller to Henry H. Sibley (July 9, 1863), supra
note 199.
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second time in. a month-his offensive pursuit, owing to the
"debilitated condition" of his men and the suffering of the animals. °2
It was in this context that Sibley appointed a military
commission on August 22, 1863 to try four prisoners.0 3 The first
defendant tried was Wo-we-na-pa, the son of Little Crow, whom a
scouting expedition of Sibley's command had captured in late July
while "scour[ing] the country." 204 Sibley charged Wo-we-na-pa with
"participation in the murders and massacres" and "attempt at
murder and horse stealing."0 5 Over the course of several days in
August and September, prosecution witnesses testified as to the
defendant's participation in the second battle of New Ulm and an
attack on the town of Hutchinson; witnesses also offered somewhat
conflicting descriptions of the circumstances of his capture.20 6
Although it does not appear that any witnesses testified that
they had seen Wo-we-na-pa engage in any particular act of killing or
horse-stealing,2 7 the transcript reveals some attempt at procedural
safeguards: Wo-we-na-pa was offered counsel and an opportunity to
cross-examine, both of which he declined.20 8 On September 29, 1863,
202.
Letter from Henry H. Sibley to J.F. Meline (Aug. 7, 1863), supra note
198, at 302 (describing Sibley's retreat in late July owing to debilitated infantry);
Letter from Henry H. Sibley to J.F. Meline (Aug. 16, 1863), supra note 199, at 305
(referring again to debilitated state of his men).
Special Order No. 300 (Aug. 22, 1863), supra note 197.
203.
Letter from Henry H. Sibley to J.F. Meline (Aug. 23, 1863), supra note
204.
200, at 909.
Commission Proceedings in the Trial of Wo-we-na-pa, supra note 197,
205.
at 3-4.
See generally id. at 4-8 (documenting David Faribault's testimony
206.
that the defendant "went into the battle with the Indians" during the attack on
New Ulm); id. at 20 (describing A.J. Campbell's testimony that the defendant was
part of a party that engaged in a battle near Hutchinson and later "attacked the
town of Hutchinson"). Compare id. at 8 (documenting one of Sibley's scout's
testimony that when the defendant was captured, "[hie was armed with a doublebarreled shot gun"), with id. at 12 (documenting one of Sibley's scout's testimony
that when the defendant was captured, he had a gun, "but as I rode up to him he
threw it down, the gun was not loaded and he had no ammunition"). For a more
detailed account of the proceedings, see Chomsky, supra note 8, at 40-43.
See Commission Proceedings in the Trial of Wo-we-na-pa, supra note
207.
197, at 6-7 (documenting Faribault's testimony that "[there were so many
Indians in the battle that I did not notice particular acts of the accused" in the
battle of Fort Ridgley and that "I did not see [the defendant] use [his gun], for the
reason that I was so far behind him").
See id. at 3 ("The accused was asked if he desired counsel, and he
208.
replied in the negative."); id. at 6 ("Rev. S.R. Riggs was sworn to truly and
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the commission found Wo-we-na-pa guilty of both counts," 9 and
Sibley, as before, approved the death sentence. 1 °
Before the execution could take place, however, the review
process took an unusual turn: in late October, Pope refused to
approve the proceedings because of what he called a "technical
difficulty." 1' He pointed out, and the Judge Advocate agreed,2 2 that
because Sibley had both ordered the commission and issued the
charges, he had violated a procedural rule that governed the courts
the military convened to try its own soldiers, i.e., the courtsmartial.2" 3
Pope's letter offers perhaps the strongest support for the
conventional wisdom that the military commission emerged to serve
as a substitute for a court of record. However, the events that
followed the issuance of this letter suggest that Pope's concern gave
way to a consensus that a military commission was different from a
court-martial, and thus, did not have to comply with all court-martial
regulations.
For example, shortly after learning of Pope's disapproval,
Sibley wrote to the Judge Advocate and argued that the regulation at
issue, requiring separation of prosecutorial and adjudicatory roles,

correctly interpret the Commission, the prisoner, and the witnesses."); id. at 8,
11, 13, 16, 23 (stating that the defendant declined to cross-examine the
prosecution's witness).
209.
Id. at 24-25.
210.
See Letter from Henry H. Sibley, Brigadier Gen., Commanding Dist.
of Minn., Gen. Staff, U.S. Volunteers (Oct. 1, 1863), in Commission Proceedings
in the Trial of Wo-we-na-pa, supra note 197.
211.
Letter from John H. Pope, Major Gen., Gen. Staff, U.S. Volunteers &
Brigadier Gen., Commanding Dep't of the Nw., Gen. Staff, U.S. Army, to Joseph
Holt, U.S. Judge Advocate Gen. (Oct. 29, 1863), in Court Martial Cases, supra
note 197.
212.
Letter from Joseph Holt, U.S. Judge Advocate Gen., to John H. Pope,
Major Gen., Gen. Staff, U.S. Volunteers & Brigadier Gen., Commanding Dep't of
the Nw., Gen. Staff, U.S. Army (Nov. 3, 1863), in Court Martial Cases, supra note
197 (agreeing with Pope that "sufficient ground is established to justify a
disapproval of the proceedings" and stating that "[a]lthough the Articles of war
only provide expressly against the trials of officers by a tribunal created by the
prosecutor who acts upon or inflicts the punishment yet the reasons for the bar
are no more apparent and forcible in such cases than in those when enlisted men
or civilians are accused").
Letter from John H. Pope to Joseph Holt (Oct. 29, 1863), supra note
213.
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did not apply to military commissions. 1 4 Sibley reminded the Judge
Advocate that this was not Sibley's view alone: both Pope and the
President had approved the first Sioux military commission, even
though it did not comply with court-martial regulations. 2' 5 The
commission, Sibley implied, was fundamentally different from a
court-martial. First, there was no need to worry about bias and
second, expediency was essential. As Sibley explained: "Nor did I
believe that the regulation referred to, was intended to control the
summary proceedings of a military commission, when prompt action
was required, and when, from the very nature of the case, no other
than the General Commanding could be in possession of the
,,216
information ..
Sibley's view that the military commission operated in a
separate sphere from the court-martial appears to have prevailed.
Although Pope expressed disapproval of the proceedings, he ordered
the defendant to be kept in confinement, under close guard, until the
President had decided on appropriate action.217 Moreover, when
Sibley convened the last of the Sioux military commissions the
following year, in 1864, neither Pope nor the Judge Advocate
expressed any qualms in approving two death sentences, even though
the 1864 commission suffered from precisely the same technical
difficulty.1 s
This last Sioux military commission arose under
circumstances similar to the first two. In autumn of 1863, Sibley
dispatched a command to the Northern outpost of Pembina to protect

Letter from Henry H. Sibley, Brigadier Gen., Commanding Dist. of
214.
Minn., Gen. Staff, U.S. Volunteers, to Joseph Holt, U.S. Judge Advocate Gen.
(Dec. 7, 1863), in Court Martial Cases, supra note 197.

215.
216.

Id.
Id.

Unaddressed Letter from John H. Pope, Major Gen., Gen. Staff, U.S.
217.
Volunteers & Brigadier Gen., Commanding Dep't of the Nw., Gen. Staff, U.S.
Army (Nov. 13, 1863), in Court Martial Cases, supra note 197.
Letter from Joseph Holt, U.S. Judge Advocate Gen., to Edwin M.
218.
Stanton, U.S. Sec'y of War (Nov. 17, 1865), in Court Martial Cases, supra note
197 (recommending that Shakopee's and Medicine Bottle's sentences be
confirmed); see also Letter from Joseph Holt, U.S. Judge Advocate Gen., to
Andrew Johnson, President of the U.S. (March 25, 1865), in Court Martial Cases,
supra note 197 (stating that Pope and Sibley had approved the proceedings and
sentence).
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against attacks by fugitive Sioux fighters who had fled to Canada.219
Once again, the United States was constrained in its ability to use
force: the military could not pursue the Sioux into Canada, as
Canada constituted British soil.220 But when two Canadian residents
kidnapped two Sioux chiefs and delivered them to Pembina,22' Sibley
responded by convening a military commission.2 22
The subsequent proceedings, which were delayed until
November 1864 owing to a lack of available officers to serve on the
commission,223 shared certain similarities to the prior proceedings:
they violated the court-martial's prohibition against combining
prosecutorial and adjudicatory roles; were conducted with similar
219.
C.W. Nash, Narrativeof Hatch's Independent Battalion of Cavalry, in
1 Minnesota in the Civil and Indian Wars, supra note 70, at 594, 595; see also
Letter from Henry H. Sibley, Brigadier Gen., Commanding Dist. of Minn., Gen.
Staff, U.S. Volunteers, to John H. Pope, Major Gen., Gen. Staff, U.S. Volunteers
& Brigadier Gen., Commanding Dep't of the Nw., Gen. Staff, U.S. Army (Oct. 10,
1864), in 2 Minnesota in the Civil and Indian Wars, supra note 74, at 522, 523
(explaining that a force had been dispatched to Pembina on October 10, 1863, "to
hold in check the hostile Sioux who had retreated for safety into her Majesty's
coterminous possessions"). Earlier in 1862, the Saint Paul Pioneer had reported
that "one thousand Sioux Indians are encamped" near Pembina and that "a
determination is expressed to open the war against the frontier settlers again in
the spring." The Sioux War Just Begun, St. Paul Pioneer, Nov. 27, 1862, at 1.
220.
Letter from Henry H. Sibley to John H. Pope (Oct. 10, 1864), supra
note 219, at 523 (describing stringent orders from Halleck that U.S. forces were
"inno case to cross the boundary line").
221.
Nash, supra note 219, at 599 (describing the kidnapping of Little Six
and Medicine Bottle). The Chicago Tribune published an account of the
kidnapping, writing:
Little Six and Medicine Bottle were taken on British soil.
Drugged liquor was given them, and, after they were well
asleep, chloroform added to their insensibility. While in this
condition they were bound upon sleds and run into Major
Hatch's camp. The act was performed by residents of the
British settlement, and, as they themselves claim, without
instigation on the part of our officers.
The Indian War, Chi. Trib., Feb. 3, 1864, at 1.
222.
Letter from Henry H. Sibley, Brigadier Gen., Commanding Dist. of
Minn., Gen. Staff, U.S. Volunteers, to John H. Pope, Major Gen., Gen. Staff, U.S.
Volunteers & Brigadier Gen., Commanding Dep't of the Nw., Gen. Staff, U.S.
Army (May 30, 1864), in 34 War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official
Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Ser. 1, Pt. 4, at 135, 135 (1888)
(announcing Sibley's plan to hold a military commission).
223.
Letter from Henry H. Sibley, Brigadier Gen., Commanding Dist. of
Minn., Gen. Staff, U.S. Volunteers, to Joseph Holt, U.S. Judge Advocate Gen.
(Dec. 14, 1864), in Court Martial Cases, supra note 197.
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expediency;22 4 involved minimal fact-finding; 25 and resulted in two
death sentences, both of which Sibley, Pope, and the Judge Advocate
226
approved.
The executive review process was also similar to that of the
1862 proceedings. In attempting to persuade the President to
approve the executions, Sibley relied not on the reliability of the
procedures, but rather, on conventional wisdom: "Apart from the
evidence given on the trials," the defendants' role in the massacre
was "a matter of notoriety." 227 Sibley said he was convinced of the
"deep criminality" of the defendants based on facts "gathered from
various sources during my command of this district for nearly two
years and a half."228 Sibley's petition was successful, and on
November 11, 1865, the two defendants were executed.229
III. IMPLICATIONS FOR TODAY
Clarifying the Record

A.

In 2006, the Supreme Court was asked to determine the
legality of the military commissions that the United States convened
following the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001. The Court
turned to the past, seeking to understand how and why such
224.

225.

See Chomsky, supra note 8, at 44-46 (describing the procedures).

The Saint Paul Pioneer wrote:
[T]here is no witness who saw either Shakopee or Medicine

Bottle kill a single person or fire at the whites in battle or
otherwise. There is no evidence that Shakopee ever went to
battle, or carried away in plunder. Four witnesses swear that
Shakopee stated that he had killed white people on the first
day of the outbreak .... On such admissions, unsupported by
other testimony, a conviction cannot be legally held in the civil
courts.
The Condemned Indians, St. Paul Pioneer, Oct. 14, 1865.
226.
Endorsement to Transcript of the Commission Proceeding in the Trial
of Shakopee, in Court Martial Cases, supra note 197; see also Letter from Joseph
Holt to Andrew Johnson (Mar. 25, 1865), supra note 218 (concluding "that the
findings of the Commission are fully warranted by the evidence in the case, and
the execution of the prisoner is strongly recommended").
227.
Letter from Henry H. Sibley to Joseph Holt (Dec. 14, 1864), supra note
223.
228.
Id.
229.
For a summary of the review process, see Chomsky, supra note 8, at
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commissions first began to emerge on America's battlefields in the
nineteenth century ° After surveying the historical record, a record
that did not include an account of the origins of the Sioux military
commission, 231 Justice Stevens reached two conclusions.
First, Justice Stevens concluded that, in general, the military
commissions emerged out of military necessity-the necessity for a
courtroom that was not otherwise available: "Generally ... the need
for military commissions during this period-as during the Mexican
War-was driven largely by the then-limited jurisdiction of courtsmartial."2 32
Second, Justice Stevens concluded that the goal in convening
such a commission was to provide the same procedural protections
afforded to one's own troops in a court-martial. As he explained,
"[t]he military commission was not born of a desire to dispense a
more summary form of justice than is afforded by courts-martial; it
developed, rather, as a tribunal of necessity to be employed when
courts-martial lacked
jurisdiction over either the accused or the
233
subject matter."
Had the Court had access to the records lodged in the
archives of Washington, D.C. and Minnesota, it might have reached a
different conclusion as to the origins of military commissions. As
discussed above, the records from the Sioux military commission
reveal that those who convened and approved this commission did
not desire to replicate the procedural protections of the court-martial
or to ensure individual adjudication. On at least three occasions,
Sibley reiterated that the military commission was fundamentally
different from a court-martial and was not intended to abide by the
same practices as did ordinary criminal tribunals.2 34 Instead, Sibley
compared the military commission to a drum-head court-martial-a
device Union officers deployed to execute Confederate guerrillas,

230.

Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 590-91 (2006).

231.
Id. (citing William Winthrop, Military Law and Precedents 831 (rev.
2d ed. 1920); George Davis, A Treatise on the Military Law of the United States
308 (2d ed. 1909)). Winthrop refers to the Sioux military commission only once, in
a footnote to support the proposition that Indians could be tried before a law-ofwar military commission. Winthrop, supra, at 838 n.98. Davis does not include
any reference to the Sioux military commission.
232.
Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 590-91.
233.
Id. at 624.
234.
See supra text accompanying notes 139, 141, 216.
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whereby soldiers brought a prisoner before an officer in the field and
typically executed the prisoner within a day.235
This decision to reject the procedural protections afforded
one's own troops makes sense when one examines the context in
which Sibley and his men sat down to conduct the military
commission, a context in which retaliation was an accepted legal
norm, states routinely paid citizens and soldiers for male Sioux
scalps, 236 newspapers published poems celebrating the hanging of
three hundred Sioux, 237 and military commanders authorized
civilians to shoot every Indian found off of the reservation.23 8
As one editorialist who supported the forced removal of the
Sioux proclaimed in protest: "This was not the way our forefathers
treated the Pequods. Daniel Boone instituted no trial by jury when
39
he caught a savage. '2
Rather than serving as a substitute for the
court designed for American soldiers, the commission was set up as a
substitute for the retaliation traditionally waged against Native
Americans.24 °

235.
See, e.g., Letter from Frank J. White, Major, Second Battalion, Mo.
Cavalry, Mo. State Militia, to F. L. Crawford, Colonel, Commanding Sub-District
of Cole Co., Mo. State Militia (Sept. 22, 1862), in 13 OR, supra note 4, at 281, 282
(describing the execution, within a day, of a prisoner who pled guilty to charges of
guerrilla warfare and was tried before a drum-head court-martial).
236.
Letter from Stephen Miller to Henry H. Sibley (July 9, 1863), supra
note 199 ("The state administration has ... offer[ed] $25 each for male Sioux
scalps, and that to both soldiers and citizens.").
237.
See The Sioux War: Charge of the Hemp Brigade, St. Paul Union,
reprinted in Mankato Wkly. Rec., Dec. 13, 1862, at 1 ("Hemp on the throat of
them, / Hemp round the neck of them, / Hemp under ears of them / Twisting and
Choking; / Stormed at with shout and yell, / Grandly they'll hang and well, / Until
the jaws of Death, / Until the mouth of Hell /Takes the three hundred.").
238.
See Letter from John H. Pope to Henry H. Sibley (Oct. 10, 1862),
supra note 155 (instructing Sibley to warn all "annuity Indians" that soldiers and
citizens were authorized to shoot any Indian found off of a reservation); see also
The Sioux War: Misplaced Philanthropy,Mankato Wkly. Rec., Dec. 6, 1862 ("Pass
stringent laws on the subject, and legalize the shooting of every Indian found
roaming outside of his reservation limits. Measures of this character are
necessary for the safety of our citizens . .

").

239.
What Shall be Done with the Indians?, St. Paul Daily Press, Oct. 10,
1862, at 1.
240.
See Alexander Ramsey, Proclamation to the People of Minnesota (Dec.
6, 1862), in St. Paul Pioneer, Dec. 7, 1862, at 1 ("The captured Sioux, instead of
being indiscriminately slaughtered in the heat of passion, as might have been
expected, were conceded an impartial trial by a military tribunal.").
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Although it is not within the scope of this Note to examine all
military commissions, there is reason to believe the Sioux military
commission was not an outlier. In the early years of the Civil War,
other leading Union officers used commissions for their strategic
value rather than to recreate the protections afforded in courtsmartial or civilian courts. For example, after capturing a prominent
Confederate guerrilla in September 1861, General Lewis Merrill
convened a military commission, explaining that "I had intended to
have him shot on Friday, but if you think the sentence will be
"
executed, he had better be tried."24
' General John McNeil, in his
campaign across Missouri to quash the guerrillas, also convened
commissions as a means of exemplary punishment: "Time and
experience proved to him," a provost-marshal observed, "that in order
to save bloodshed it was necessary to show some examples of severe
punishment."24 2
But perhaps most strikingly, General Henry W. Halleck, the
officer who penned the guidelines for military commissions that were
in force when Sibley convened his commission,243 does not appear to
have intended for military commissions to replicate courts-martial.
Although Halleck instructed his troops to use a process similar to
that of the court-martial when trying enemies, he notably did not
simply adopt the court-martial procedures, as he might easily have
done.244 Instead, in passages of General Orders No. 1 that have
received less attention in the scholarly literature, 245 Halleck
241.
See Letters exchanged between John Schofield, Commanding Dist.
Mo., Gen. Staff, U.S. Volunteers & Brigadier Gen., Commanding Mo. State
Militia, and Lewis Merrill, Brigadier Gen., Mo. State Militia; Colonel, Second
Cavalry, Mo. Volunteers, & Captain, Second Calvary, U.S. Army (Sept. 9, 1862),
in 13 OR, supra note 4, at 621, 621.
242.
Strachan, supra note 115, at 864 (describing the commission and
same-day execution of fifteen guerrillas).
243.
Gen. Orders No. 1 (Jan. 1, 1862), in 8 War of the Rebellion: A
Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Ser. 1,
476, 476 (1883) [hereinafter 8 OR].
244.
Id. ("Military commissions . . . should be ordered by the same
authority, be constituted in a similar manner, and their proceedings be conducted
according to the same general rules as courts-martial, in order to prevent abuses
which might otherwise arise.").
245.
See, e.g., Brief of Military Law Historians, Scholars, and Practitioners
(Military Commissions and the Articles of War) at 23-24, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,
548 U.S. 557 (2006) (No. 05-184) (analyzing General Orders Number 1 but
focusing on aspects other than Article 3's qualification "as may be applicable" and
Article 4's reference to civil tribunals); Glazier, supra note 14, at 41-42 (same);
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instructed officers in Article Three of the orders that not all of the
rules governing court-martial proceedings applied to military
commissions, but only those that "may be applicable. 46 He
ultimately declined to specify which of the statutory rules governing
courts-martial2 47 qualified as applicable, apparently leaving it to the
discretion of the convening officer.2 48 Furthermore, in Article Four,
Halleck instructed officers that military commissions could be
convened "even in places where civil tribunals exist,"2 49 suggesting
that the commission was not solely an emergency jurisdictional gapfiller.
In fact, on the day that Halleck issued these instructions for
military commissions, he appears to have been seeking a substitute
not for a court of law, but rather for military force: insurgent rebels
were blowing up railroads and bridges2 50 and Halleck's efforts to
defeat them had failed,25 ' leading him to conclude that a traditional
army was simply no match for guerrilla warfare. As Sibley would do
in the months to come, when faced with a formidable enemy, Halleck
opted for severe punishment via military commission.252
While more comparative work remains to be done, these
examples suggest that the Sioux military commission was not an

Detlev F. Vagts, Military Commissions: The ForgottenReconstruction Chapter, 23
Am. U. Int'l L. Rev. 231, 261-62 (2008) (citing General Orders Number 1 as
support for the proposition that "military commission proceedings have always
been governed by the rules pertaining to courts-martial" but focusing on aspects
other than Article 3's qualification as may be applicable).
246.
Gen. Orders No. 1, supra note 243, at 477.
247.
See An Act for Establishing Rules and Articles for the Government of
the Army of the United States, arts. 64-93, 2 Stat. 359, 367-70 (1806).
248.
Gen. Orders No. 1, supra note 243, at 477-78 (offering no further
instructions as to which court-martial rules were applicable to military
commissions).
249.
Id. at 477.
250.
Letter from Henry W. Halleck, Major Gen., Commanding Dep't of Mo.,
Gen. Staff, U.S. Army, to John M. Schofield, Commanding Dist. Mo., Gen. Staff,
U.S. Volunteers & Brigadier Gen., Commanding Mo. State Militia (Dec. 25, 1861),
in 8 OR, supra note 243, at 462, 462.
251.
Letter from Henry W. Halleck, Major Gen., Commanding Dep't of Mo.,
Gen. Staff, U.S. Army, to Thomas Ewing, Chief Justice, Kan. Supreme Court
(Jan. 1, 1862), in 8 OR, supra note 243, at 475, 476.
252.
See id. at 475-76 ("I am satisfied that nothing but the severest
punishment can prevent the burning of railroad bridges and the great destruction
of human life .... I have determined to put down these insurgents and bridge-

burners with a strong hand. It must be done; there is no other remedy ...").
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outlier. The military commission, it seems, may not have enjoyed the
illustrious beginnings the Supreme Court described.
B.

Broadening the Debate

The wrinkle in the historical narrative posed by the origins of
the Sioux military commission is of more than academic interest. It
invites us to broaden the debate from the question of whether
military commissions are legal and constitutional, and if so what
additional safeguards should be added, to the more fundamental
question of whether, if the goal is to achieve accurate, reliable factfinding and individual due process, we ought to be relying at all on
an instrument whose architects did not set out to achieve those goals.
In carrying out this debate, it may be useful to consult the
normative views of the architect himself. For although Sibley was
adamant that the commission was not intended to emulate a courtmartial or a criminal trial, his personal writings and petitions for
pardons following the commission reveal that he was at times
conflicted over whether this was the way the world ought to respond
to perceived violations of the law of war. For example, on October 17,
1862, he confided to his wife, Sarah:
The military commission is still at work and the Indian
prisoners are being tried so fast as a due regard for justice
will permit. I have to review all the proceedings, and decide
the fate of each individual. This power of life, and death, is
an awful thing to exercise, and when I think of more than
three hundred human beings are subject to that power,
lodged in my hands, it makes me shudder. Still, duty
25 must
be performed, and judgment visited upon the guilty. 3
Three days later, Sibley wrote to Sarah again, to say that he did not
"propose to murder any man, even a savage, who is shown to be
innocent of the 'great transgression.' or "permit [0 the massacres of
women and children."" 4 And one week later, after another one
hundred prisoners were tried, Sibley once again invoked the notion of

253.
Letter from Henry H. Sibley, Brigadier Gen., Commanding Dist. of
Minn., Gen. Staff, U.S. Volunteers, to Sarah Sibley (Oct. 17, 1862), in Sibley
Papers, supra note 30.
254.
Letter from Henry H. Sibley to Sarah Sibley (Oct. 20, 1862), supra
note 147.
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fair play: "[W]e are trying the prisoners as rapidly as fair play, and a
due regard to justice will admit."255
These writings suggest that although Sibley did not intend
for the commission to function as an ordinary court-martial or
criminal tribunal, he increasingly sought to assure some form of fair
play. As he wrote to Lincoln two months after the commission had
ended, at a time when it had come under intense criticism, he did not
take the responsibility lightly:
I myself have revised and carefully scrutinized those
proceedings and approved of the findings in each particular
case, only after being fully convinced of their propriety and
justice. I endeavored to guide myself in this grave and
important matter by all the light and information I could
obtain and under a deep sense
of my responsibility as an
256
officer and a Christian man.
In March of 1863, Sibley offered a similar defense of the
commission to Minnesota's Bishop, Henry B. Whipple. 7 Upon
learning that Sibley had recommended an additional fifty executions,
the Bishop had written Sibley to warn that "[Tihe verdict of the
civilized world will condemn such action as unjust."258 Resorting to

legal argumentation, Whipple argued that because the Sioux had
surrendered under white flags, "the punishment of these men . . .
cannot be justified by any laws human or divine."259
Sibley's response to this charge of injustice offers further
support that, in the wake of the commission, Sibley sought to defend
255.
Letter from Henry H. Sibley, Brigadier Gen., Commanding Dist. of
Minn., Gen. Staff, U.S. Volunteers (Oct. 13, 1862), in Sibley Papers, supra note
30; Letter from Henry H. Sibley to Sarah Sibley (Oct. 17, 1862), supra note 253
("The Indian prisoners are being tried so fast as a due reg. to justice will
permit."); Letter from Henry H. Sibley to Sarah Sibley (Oct. 30, 1862), in Sibley
Papers, supra note 30 ("We are trying the prisoners as rapidly as fair play, and a
due regard for justice will admit.").
256.
Letter from Henry H. Sibley, Brigadier Gen., Commanding Dist. of
Minn., Gen. Staff, U.S. Volunteers, to Abraham Lincoln, President of the U.S.
(Feb. 16, 1863), in Records of U.S. Army Continental Commanders (NARG 393),
Letters and Telegrams Sent, Entry 343.
257.
See Letter from Henry H. Sibley, Brigadier Gen., Commanding Dist.
of Minn., Gen. Staff, U.S. Volunteers, to Henry B. Whipple, Bishop of Minn. (Mar.
11, 1863), in Whipple Papers, supra note 141.
258.
Letter from Henry B. Whipple, Bishop of Minn., to Henry H. Sibley,
Brigadier Gen., Commanding Dist. of Minn., Gen. Staff, U.S. Volunteers (Mar. 7,
1863), in Whipple Papers, supra note 141.
259.
Id.
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the procedures not simply on grounds of military necessity, but also
on grounds of procedural fairness. For example, Sibley began by
defending his role in the commission not on the premise that
summary proceedings were necessary, but rather, by asserting that
"no one was better qualified to judge of all the facts.. . involving the
guilt or innocence of the prisoners."2 60 Likewise, Sibley characterized
his review of the records as a "long, laborious, and dispassionate
examination."261 Sibley also expressed confidence in the sentences,
reiterating that he would have executed all the Indians convicted,
"excepting only those of whose criminality there was a reasonable
doubt."262 He concluded, "I am as anxious as you are, that the
these people shall be shielded from harm and unjust
innocent among
263
reproach."
But while Sibley sought to present the proceedings as fair
and discerning, he also continued to defend the commission as a
strategic device: he noted that his hoped-for execution would have
helped "spare" thousands of innocent lives in the future. 64 Taken
together, however, Sibley's defenses of procedural fairness suggest
that Sibley may have doubted whether military necessity alone
justified summary proceedings.
Equally telling is the fact that, in the months after the
commission, Sibley submitted the first of what was to be several
petitions for pardons of those whom the commission had sentenced to
death, on the grounds that the defendant had acted under duress.26 5
Two years later, Sibley joined in requesting an additional four
pardons, citing reasonable doubt of guilt that had come to light since
the commission ended.266 Finally, in March of 1866, President

260.
Letter from Henry H. Sibley to Henry B. Whipple (Mar. 11, 1863),
supra note 257.
261.
Id. at 2. Sibley also rebutted Whipple's charge that he had misled the
Sioux into surrendering, explaining that "no such [white] flags, strictly speaking,
were used." Id. at 1. Although white emblems were displayed to designate
messengers and the friendly camp, Sibley explained that he had never implied

that the guilty would avoid punishment. Id.
262.
Id. at 2.
263.
Id. at 3.
264.
Id.
265.

Chomsky, supra note 8, at 38-40.

266.

Id.
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Johnson issued a general pardon of the Sioux and ordered the release
of all remaining prisoners.26 7
During this time, Sibley's contemporaries also debated
whether an ordinary criminal trial might have been more
appropriate. One editorialist in the Saint Paul Daily Press suggested
that if the government failed to carry out the executions "by military
process," the state should resort to a civil judicial process by which a
grand jury would issue a formal indictment, and those indicted would
stand trial in Minnesota state courts. 268 And indeed, there is evidence
to suggest that seventeenth-century American colonists had relied on
criminal trials to adjudicate cases in which Native Americans were
charged with killing civilians during war.269

267.
Order for Pardon of Sioux Indians, Apr. 30, 1864, in 7 Collected Works
of Abraham Lincoln 325-26 (R.Basler ed. 1954).
268.
See, e.g., Let The Laws Be Executed, St. Paul Daily Press, Nov. 12,
1862, at 1 ("If, therefore, the Federal authorities will not hang them by military
process, the civil authorities will be justified in issuing warrants for the
immediate arrest of the murderers, and turning them over to our courts."); see
also Ramsey, Proclamation to the People of Minnesota, supra note 240, at 1 ("If
the President shall decline to punish [the Sioux], the case will then clearly come
within the jurisdiction of our civil court."); Letter from Henry B. Whipple to
Henry M. Rice (Nov. 29, 1862), supra note 179 (noting that although he
personally had "no means of knowing how carefully [the commission] was
conducted," his "only wish is that the trial of all shall be such as to carefully
scrutinize between the guilty and the innocent").
269.
See, e.g., James D. Drake, King Phillip's War: Civil War in New
England 1675-1676, at 158 (1999) (recounting how the Plymouth Court tried and
condemned to death a group of three Indians for killing a white woman during
King Phillip's War, reasoning that "the said engagement was to be understood
with exception against such as by murder ...and not against such as killed his
enimie in the field in a souldier like way"). Drake describes how Indians accused
of committing a crime against humanity were tried in a civilian court:
These Indians, not operating within the bounds of military
conduct as traditionally defined, were thus held accountable in
a civil court for having committed a crime against humanity.
Having demonstrated no restraint and no mercy, they deserved
none. The immunities reserved for prisoners of war did not
apply to these three, who were scrupulously distinguished from
the others who had surrendered.
Id. at 159; see also Glassley, supra note 54, at 47-48 (describing how, in 1850,
after the Territorial Governor of Oregon secured the surrender of five Cayuses
who were accused of killing civilians in the "Whitman Massacre" of 1847, the
Territory prosecuted the defendants in Oregon City and "every care was taken to
assure a fair trial").
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These examples suggest that the military commission was
neither an inevitable nor universally accepted response to attacks on
civilians. As the editors of the New York Times advised the President
in 1862, the challenge may be to find a solution that will "best serve
the ends of justice, promote the safety and welfare of the Western
people, and
consult the honor and permanent credit of the
270
country."
CONCLUSION
Nearly one hundred and forty years ago, as the 1862 Sioux
military commission was drawing to a close, an observer remarked
that "[a] military commission . . . is not the place for the clear
bringing out of evidence and securing a fair trial to everyone."271
This Note has argued that, at least in the case of the Sioux
military commission, the commission was not such a place because
those who convened it never envisioned that it would be. Rather than
serving as a substitute for the courtroom in which American soldiers
or civilians would be tried, the military commission of 1862 was
deployed by both the commander-in-chief and his army as a strategic
tool in a war against an enemy that could not easily be defeated on
the battlefield. The roots of this commission and the doubts harbored
by those involved call into question what it is that the United States
hoped to achieve when it established military commissions at
Guantdnamo Bay. For if the goal is to provide the procedural
safeguards of an otherwise unavailable courtroom, the story of the
Sioux military commission suggests it may well be time to find
another means.
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Editorial, The Hanging of the Indians, N.Y. Times, Dec. 8, 1862, at 4.
Stephen R. Riggs, Letter to the Editor, supra note 161.

